There has not been enough discussion on the ramification to the stock market of a stable dollar: one that is neither inflating nor deflating. Maybe the FED will be successful in printing just the right number of dollars to offset the ongoing credit collapse. This will move more and more impaired private (bank, GSE and otherwise) assets to the FED balance sheet. This sounds like a very good outcome for the stock market. But is it?
Japan is the best modern example of a credit crisis-led economic correction. There is only one other example among a major developed economy over the past 100 years, and that is the Great Depression of the 1930s. All other modern examples (since 1900) are in smaller and emerging economies with currencies that are not widely traded and therefore, do not really inform the debate.
The devastation wrought by the 1990 collapse of the Japanese banking system after several years of overheated real estate and stock market speculation is still being felt today. The Yen versus other major currencies, like the dollar, has continued to strengthen over the past 20 years (from over 1/150 a dollar to 1/85 a dollar, today), further exacerbating economic contraction in Japan as industrial exports are hurt. The result is the NIKKEI stock market average remains stuck near 25% of its peak of nearly 40,000, 20 years later.
Could this happen to the Dow Jones Industrial average (and other American market indexes)? Considering that the real estate asset collapse in America as of August 2010 is nearly as large as a percentage of the peak as the Japanese collapse, according to the Reinhart-Rogoff study in “This Time It’s Different”, my conclusion is that, yes, it could. The probability may not be more than 20-25%, but the impact would be so significant to the soon-to-retire baby boomers, that it is very much worth considering.
Even if the economy does not slip into deflation, there appears to be very little traction from the FED’s efforts to stimulate the economy by manipulating the money supply. There is a point where FED policy resembles “pushing on a string” and stimulation is not rewarded. It is quite possible we are at that point. Over one trillion dollars has been created by the FED to fill the void of credit contraction and stock market liquidation. This amount now shows up on the FED balance sheet. Bernanke announced on Tuesday that the FED would hold that amount of stimulus constant, replacing maturing mortgage assets with Treasuries. But while this QE action may have stopped the collapse of the banks, it has apparently not renewed growth in the economy. Whatever growth was achieved by fiscal stimulation was very expensive (and will be a burden on future tax payers). There is no more political will to extend such inefficient fiscal stimulation. So, the FED is in the proverbial box.
Most Americans under 70 are only familiar with equity markets (and debt markets) that function in an inflationary environment. It has been 60 years since we last had a low or no inflation economy. We are accustomed to see the value of the stock market grow in nominal terms by 10-12% a year, which was the much promoted long run return prior to 2007. But what about the “real” rate long run return? The real return is all that matters after subtracting the effects of inflation (the depreciating dollar).
What is the true appreciation in the stock market since the last great crisis, that of the 1930s? Some assumptions must be made in order to do this analysis. This is a “cocktail napkin” exercise, so the assumptions will be quite broad and general. One assumption is the amount of inflation (dollar depreciation) that has occurred in the American economy since 1929. There are many ways to derive this value, but I will use 20 times. Comparing CPI from government data delivers a 12 times factor. But CPI intentionally under reports inflation since it is used to calculate entitlement payments. Using gold as a reference will generate a 50 times factor ($20/oz versus $1000/oz). Using a commodity like bread shows a 30X factor (5 cents per loaf versus $1.50). So, 20 times is a reasonable compromise.
Backing out 20 times dollar inflation between 1929 and 2010 and using the Dow Jones Industrial average as the comparative index will provide a “real” value for the DJI of $520 based on today’s close around 10,400. Using the DJI introduces other assumptions, but if anything, the bias over time with the DJI is to the upside as it is regularly reconstructed with newer more modern companies replacing older and poorer performing (or merged) companies. If we could easily adjust for such bias, the equivalent value of the DJI would be less than $500. But we also ignore dividends in this simple analysis, so let’s call it a wash.
So, what is the compounded annual return on the DJI (as a proxy for the overall market) between 1929 and 2010? Using a CAGR calculation in Excel, I get 0.50% equity return per year. That is all. Not very much.
What does this imply for the future? If the dollar does not significantly depreciate over the next 20 years and the FED is able to engineer a stable dollar from this point forward, the DJI may still be less than 12,000 in 2030. For there to be significant "nominal" gains in the DJI over the next 20 years will require significant Inflation. If the FED is unsuccessful in creating inflation and the American economy falls into the type of deflationary trap gripping Japan, the DJI could fall below 10,000 and stay there for 20 years with a zero return in nominal terms.
It has happened before in America (the 1930-1950 period). It is happening now in Japan and it could happen in America going forward.
Something to consider.
Disclosure: Short the market through SDS (double inverse to SP500)
The European Central Bank (ECB) has acted much too slowly and without the consensus of its constituent countries during the current European sovereign debt crises. Rather than learning the lessons taught by the American Fed Reserve, Treasury and Congress in 2008, the ECB has equivocated, delayed actions and then subsequently had to reverse itself damaging its own credibility in the process. The head of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, likely initiated the path to disaster by moving to raise European interest rates in early 2010 against the advice of other central bankers, including American US Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner. This had the effect of further eroding already crippled Euro state economies including those of the southern tier of states: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
In the past two months, sovereign debt problems have grown worse with the indebted states paying higher interest rates, in large part because of the early 2010 ECB announced actions to tighten money supply. The lack of ECB commitment to support the over-levered states and work with them to reduce debt also contributed to the unwillingness of bond holders to continue lending at reasonable interest rates, pushing rates and budget deficits higher. It doesn't help government insolvency prospects that the debt has become more expensive to refinance and that higher interest payments further undermine national budget deficits.
There are only two ways out of these crises. And until very recently, Trichet and the ECB didn't appear interested in either approach. The least favored, other than breaking up the EU altogether, is to undergo sovereign defaults on the debt owed. This would allow for restructuring of the terms of payment through a process similar to bankruptcy, but without a court or judge. The resetting of bonds would lower interest payments and possibly principal payments reducing the burden on the distressed states. The problem with defaulting on debt is the ripple effects it will have through the global financial system. It would likely result in an unwinding of derivatives and a series of bank and investment fund failures in a replay of 2008. This would be very unsettling for world capital markets and could result in a second and deeper recession than in 2008-09 as lending and consumption freezes up. Higher unemployment and even civil chaos could be the result.
A second approach, more desirable for its less onerous consequences, would be to devalue the Euro by monetary quantitative expansion (QE), i.e. printing money. Of course, today money is not physically printed to increase the amount in circulation. It happens via accounting entries to each countries currency account at the ECB. A CNBC story today proposed that 10% of GNP be credited to each EU country's account. This would immediately increase national currency balances in Euro terms. Currency is an asset on the national balance sheets, so immediately goes to reduce the deficit, if artificially so. By having more currency in circulation without any commensurate liabilities or national productivity increase as measured by GNP, it would also serve to devalue the Euro by the same 10% amount. This is essentially what has been taking place in the marketplace anyway, as the Euro has lost over 20% of its value versus the American dollar so far in 2010. But to have the market make the adjustment can be unsettling for global markets and not as controlled as if the ECB manages the process.
The devalued Euro currency would be used to repay sovereign bond debt. Since the Euro would be worth less (an additional 10% reduction on top of the 20% devaluation to date in 2010), the bonds would be worth 30% less in an alternate currency, including gold. Interest payments on the bond principal would also cost 30% less in alternate currencies. So, in this way, bonds are reset to a lower principal level, without the negative global consequences associated with forcing bond holders to accept changed terms through the process of default.
If this inflationary action is not taken, the debt reduction programs underway in Europe will reduce currency in circulation and will act to deflate the Euro. Deflations result in a higher value currency versus alternate forms of currency, including gold. Without any counteracting inflating of the Euro, it will rise against the US dollar, possibly to 1.50 or 1.60 EU to the $1.00. This will further hurt European competitiveness and will extend the global economic contraction.
Here is a link to the CNBC article by Warren Mosler that recommends devaluing / inflating the Euro.
As I post this article, the economic leaders of the G20 nations are meeting in Busan, South Korea to discuss global economies and the policies needed to continue the recovery from the 2008-09 debt crisis. We are at a critical moment and the central bankers and government leaders must make the right policy moves on monetary policy, debt management and economic growth. Tim Geithner has been pressing the European nations and Japan to encourage consumption so that America and China do not have to bear the entire global load.
The next 2-4 weeks will tell the story whether the Europeans get it right and manage their currency and sovereign debt in a way that does not panic the capital markets and kill the global economic recovery. There is some promising news as on June 2, Trichet reversed the course previously set and offered to extend the low rate environment to ease the pressure on the over-indebted Euro states.
Hey everyone, Jared here, I just wanted to take a minute to explain to everyone how important it is to always check your credit score. The other day I ordered my credit score since this past year has been pretty rough for me and I wanted to see where I was sitting. Much to my surprise and dismay, I found that my credit had been hurt by a bunch of fraudulent charges on credit cards that were taken out under my name but were never in my possession. Luckily this happened pretty recently so I was able to fix the problem before it did any serious damage. If you would like to view your credit score there are many ways to go about it, but I have found that creditscorequick.com is a great way to get your full, accurate score for a reasonable price. Don't let identity theft happen to you, with the economy the way it is right now, the last thing anyone needs is to be a victim of identity theft.
Those who talk finance with me know that I have an abiding respect for investor Bill Ackman. It comes close to man-love, I must admit. Bill is eloquent, thoughtful, intelligent, well-informed and any other adjective that gives praise.
My first experience reading about and listening to Bill came about this time last year when I was struggling with whether to invest in General Growth Properties. At the time last April, GGP was entering bankruptcy. But the market and economy had just begun to turn and I had personal experience with GGP properties and management and thought the company had excellent mall properties and was well run. I wanted to invest in GGP which was then selling for only $0.65 per share and had a total capitalization only around $200M on a business with properties once valued at $30B. If it were possible to solve the debt problem at GGP, then the company had an excellent chance of survival.
Enter Bill Ackman into my life. As I was researching GGP, I came across research that Bill had put together as his hedge fund, Pershing Square Capital Management. He had done a very thorough job researching GGP and was able to show that with even modest "cap rate" assumptions, GGP would do very well. All it needed was time to restructure its debt. Ackman proceeded to take an active role in buying time for GGP, first by offering to provide bridge (DIP) financing (later provided by another party), helping convince the court of the merits of GGPs survival and later by joining the GGP Board of Directors.
As the year 2009 progressed, Ackman's activism and my confidence in his research proved very profitable for both of us. I have now exited my GGP investment (much too early) but Ackman, to my knowledge, remains on board and has seen his investment return over 20-fold. I admire this type of clear vision and the courage to act on it.
Ackman was a noted short trader earlier in his career. He gained notoriety for his big short position in credit card company MBIA in 2005, for which he was investigated by the now-notorious Elliot Spitzer, then New York State Attorney General. He was able to demonstrate to Mr. Spitzer his innocence and turned the table on MBIA by exposing the Attorney General their fraudulent practices, the reason for his short position (presaging the debt crisis to come). He took a "sow's ear" and turned it into the proverbial "silk purse". That taxes moxy. That takes class.
Given his career path and the level to which he has risen, Ackman is very intimate with the inner workings of Wall Street. He shows himself to be rational and level-headed and has a thorough, first-hand understanding of the arcane financial instruments that Wall Street has created. So, when he gives his opinion on the Goldman Sachs situation, I listen (much more so than to EF Hutton). Today as guest host on CNBC Squawk Box, Bill Ackman shared with us his assessment. He comes down on the side of Goldman Sachs for all the reasons I have provided in the past two weeks, but with the conviction that can come from only an insider. Here is an excerpt from the show:
Goldman Sachs did not commit fraud and the insurance company that bought the product that is the subject of a government investigation should have known the risks, Bill Ackman, founder and CEO of hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management, told CNBC Tuesday.
“I don’t believe that Goldman committed fraud,” Ackman told “Squawk Box Europe.” “(ACA, the counterparty to Goldman - Paulson Partners) took their own risks. "They’re sophisticated investors.” “I don’t think the (Securities and Exchange Commission) has a good case,” Ackman said.
“Having been the subject of investigation in the past (for the MBIA case referenced earlier)… I don’t feel sorry for Goldman Sachs, but they’re not being treated fairly (either).”
Not only does Ackman contend that Goldman is innocent of the charges of fraud, as I also maintain, in addition, it would even have been unethical if Goldman had disclosed that hedge fund manager John Paulson was shorting the housing trade to any investors taking long positions, Ackman said.
Ackman argued that sophisticated investors (the German and Dutch bank that bought the long positions from ACA) have the information at their disposal to make their own decisions, and are also responsible for their own mistakes.
“Imagine that Soros and Buffett were on the two sides of this transaction,” he said. “We wouldn’t even be talking about this now.”
But later in the interview, Ackman states that the true victims are the taxpayers as they do not know they are party to the trade via "too big to fail" and taxpayer rescues. This is true in Germany and the UK, as well as in America. It is the taxpayer that has to cover the losses made by overly aggressive bank managers who are playing with OTM (other people's money) in order to win large bonuses.
So, it is not Goldman Sachs that should be taking the fall for the financial crisis, but the bank managers that lost money and the regulators / government officials that are charged by the public with protecting the financial system. The "witch hunt" that is today's Congressional hearing is completely misdirected and intended to make the Congressmen who failed in their sworn responsibilities, look better, much better, than they really are.
At the end of this segment, the former SEC general counsel, Simon Lorne, appeared with Bill Ackman. Mr. Lorne offered his highly informed opinion that the case by the SEC against Goldman Sachs is "weak". This is the position I have maintained. The facts will show that there was no "fraud". If anything, there may have been some technical error of omission where disclosure is involved. This might justify a fine of some sort, even a large fine given the stakes involved. But Mr. Lorne says it all much better than me:
Disclosure: I am long GS with October Call contracts; If I could be, I would be short the Congress;
And now for the rest of the story, as Paul Harvey liked to say.
Today's post is a follow on to my post from last Friday, August 16. At that time, Goldman Sachs, GS, was being charged by the SEC in a civil suit for failing to disclose John Paulson's (Paulson Companies) participation in a CDO fund invested in sub-prime mortgages. This failure constitutes fraud if it is intended to deceive. The failure might be found a technicality in court of there was no intent. The SEC is hungry for a scapegoat for the banking crisis. GS, which went through the crisis almost unscathed, is an attractive target in the mind of the Obama Administration both because it is large and because it profited during the crisis. Getting GS would satisfy some of the populist blood-lust of Obama's public, even at the expense of the overall economy, as it hurts banks which just now on the mend.
But, as is often the case, this might be much ado about nothing. I thought as much last week and now the details are appearing that prove this point.
The first big new piece of information comes from an article written in the Wall Street Journal on Monday. In this article is a portion of an interview with Paolo Pellegrini who was the deal maker for John Paulson on the contested CDO case.
With this release the story became a little clearer the last couple of days. It turns out that Obama's government might be trying to deceive the public itself. The SEC covered up, or at least did not make public, the fact that they had an interview with Pellegrini of the Paulson company. In that interview it was revealed by Pellegrini there were discussions directly with ACA at the time of the selection of the CDOs and that ACA was made aware that Paulson would be taking the opposite side of the transaction (going short) which ACA needed to get the deal done. We also found this week that the SEC vote was partisan, (3) Democrats to (2) Republicans in favor of filing the lawsuit with Obama appointee, Mary Schapiro, casting the tie breaking vote.
Here is a little background on Pellegrini's role in the deal, from WSJ on April 19, Monday:
The main contention of the SEC in bringing the civil charges against Goldman is that it deceived "the public" when it failed to disclose its client, Paulson Companies, was taking a short position in the sub-prime CDO deal, while Paulson had a hand in selecting the mortgages. Now it is revealed, that ACA, the "third party", was in fact the first party and the primary buyer of the CDOs it created, around $950M of the $1B. Goldman bought $90M itself. And, in fact, it sought out Pellegrini from the Paulson Companies to do the deal, not the other way around. So it seems this was a one-on-one deal and both the buyer and seller were in conversation about what comprised the deal. So, there was complete and full disclosure.
This blows a very wide hole in the SEC's case and in fact, brings a huge question mark to the motives for bringing the charges. These potential political motives are now under investigation by the Congressional watchdog committee run by CA Rep Darrel Issa, top Republican on the Congressional Oversight Committee.
Also, this testimony (from Pellegrini to the SEC) reinforced the key point I have been making: ACA knew that Paulson was taking a short position. ACA was looking for someone to take the other side of the deal which is why they chased down Pellegrini on vacation in Jackson Hole to have meetings. They let Pellegrini suggest mortgage packages (RMBS) to get Paulson on board the deal. Also, ACA was the primary buyer of the CDOs and so there was complete disclosure directly to the buyer as to whom was the seller.
The SEC case looks like it may be going down in flames and there is a good chance there will be discovery of political motivations behind the accusations. Should be fun to watch.