A response to a post by my good blog friend, Nirav:

Nirav, this is the problem with professors having opinions. Some people may want to think those opinions are more meaningful or well-informed because a given professor happens to be employed by a school like Stanford, or NYU (Roubini). But, such professors opinions about the future are no better than yours or mine. Professors should teach, and not opine.

The first thing wrong with Taylor’s opinion is his lack of command of basic financial math. A 100% change in nominal GDP over 10 years (and the resultant 50% cut in debt to GNP ratio) does not require a 10% annual inflation, but a 7.2% inflation, according to the Rule of 72, something any college finance or economics professor should know. I fully expect a 6-7% inflation within 2 years and think the Fed and Treasury are actually trying to orchestrate that.

The second thing wrong with the Professor’s opinion is the statement that a “permanent 60% tax increase would be required” to balance the budget. That statement is inconsistent with the 10% inflation conclusion. I think taxes could be left unchanged, or only increased to the degree Obama proposes, along with spending decreases, and inflation will do the rest. Not only will inflation cheapen the debt over time, it also will increase the number of dollars in which the debt is paid off. Anyone who owned a home in the 1970s remembers what a good deal inflation was at that time, so long as the mortgage was fixed. You could buy a $40K home, watch it appreciate to $80K with inflation, but pay off the debt as though it were still $40K. To the degree the Feds fix our interest costs (by issuing 30 year bonds which they should be doing in a big way right now), we will all benefit from the repayment in debt with ever cheaper dollars.

Inflation is the only way out of this box. I think the 1970s scenario is not only likely to occur, but welcome. It helped us resolve our Johnson era “guns and butter” Great Society debt of the 1960s, which in its time, was every bit as problematic as where we are today.

I would go on to say that as a responsible investor, it is important to try and anticipate the future, and not wait for it to run you over.  If inflation is in our future, as I think it most surely is, then a prudent investment strategy will take that into account.  The way to not only beat, but prosper from inflation is to own hard (real) assets, or stocks thereof. 

Oil, natural gas, industrial metals, precious metals, timberland, ag commodities, all the equipment suppliers to those industries (Joy Global, Deere, Cat, Monsanto, Nabors, Transocean, Dow Chemical, Dupont), and even real estate or REITs in the near future (once RE stops deflating) will all benefit from a long period of moderate inflation.  The Fed has demonstrated in the past its ability to prevent hyper-inflation, so that should not be a great worry.  Ben Bernanke knows the economics playbook very well.  So, rather than nashing teeth over the course of easy money and tax deficits, instead, put those actions to your own advantage.

Here is his post:

How to Reduce a Trillion Dollar Deficit

Some of you may remember Michael Milken.  He was The Bad Boy from the 1980s leveraged buyout (LBO) craze and the father of modern junk bond debt financing to conduct LBOs.  He ran the Drexel Burnham Lambert high yield bond desk until 1989 at which point, he ran it into the ground and in 1990, DBL out of business.  For this and other mischief and overreaching, he earned himself a one-way ticket to Federal prison for SEC violations in his dealings with client and fellow Bad Boy, Ivan Boesky.  Milken served a two year prison sentence and apparently came back a changed and philanthropic man.

So, if anyone can speak with authority on the national bond market and what it means to business, it should be Michael Milken.  How refreshing he has turned his formidable analytical powers to helping the rest of us understand the bond market. 

Today (Tuesday, August 21)  in the WSJ, Milken published an editorial on the corporate bond market drawing parallels to the mid 1970s.  Those of you that are loyal “Wealth-Ed” readers know that I am of the opinion that history is a prelude to the future, that is history (almost) repeats.  I have also noted the market similarities between now and the mid 1970s as well as the late 1930s.   Milken puts some specific analysis behind that speculation.

In Milken’s opinion, we are working through the worst of times and not far from much better times.  I have been recommending investments in the high yield bond market as the spreads (TED spread) between high yield and Treasuries were until recently at record levels.  The fact those spreads are improving shows healing in the market.  The bond market almost always gets the story right before the stock market.  So an improving high yield market is a good indicator for stocks and the economy.

• OPINION
• APRIL 21, 2009

Why Capital Structure Matters

Companies that repurchased stock

By MICHAEL MILKEN

Thirty-five years ago business publications were writing that major money-center banks would fail, and quoted investors who said, “I’ll never own a stock again!” Meanwhile, some state and local governments as well as utilities seemed on the brink of collapse. Corporate debt often sold for pennies on the dollar while profitable, growing companies were starved for capital.

Chad Crowe

If that all sounds familiar today, it’s worth remembering that 1974 was also a turning point. With financial institutions weakened by the recession, public and private markets began displacing banks as the source of most corporate financing. Bonds rallied strongly in 1975-76, providing underpinning for the stock market, which rose 75%. Some high-yield funds achieved unleveraged, two-year rates of return approaching 100%.

The accessibility of capital markets has grown continuously since 1974. Businesses are not as dependent on banks, which now own less than a third of the loans they originate. In the first quarter of 2009, many corporations took advantage of low absolute levels of interest rates to raise $840 billion in the global bond market. That’s 100% more than in the first quarter of 2008, and is a typical increase at this stage of a market cycle. Just as in the 1974 recession, investment-grade companies have started to reliquify. Once that happens, the market begins to open for lower-rated bonds. Thus BB- and B-rated corporations are now raising capital through new issues of equity, debt and convertibles.

This cyclical process today appears to be where it was in early 1975, when balance sheets began to improve and corporations with strong capital structures started acquiring others. In a single recent week, Roche raised more than $40 billion in the public markets to help finance its merger with Genentech. Other companies such as Altria, HCA, Staples and Dole Foods, have used bond proceeds to pay off short-term bank debt, strengthening their balance sheets and helping restore bank liquidity. These new corporate bond issues have provided investors with positive returns this year even as other asset groups declined.

The late Nobel laureate Merton Miller and I, although good friends, long debated whether this kind of capital-structure management is an essential job of corporate leaders. Miller believed that capital structure was not important in valuing a company’s securities or the risk of investing in them.

My belief — first stated 40 years ago in a graduate thesis and later confirmed by experience — is that capital structure significantly affects both value and risk. The optimal capital structure evolves constantly, and successful corporate leaders must constantly consider six factors — the company and its management, industry dynamics, the state of capital markets, the economy, government regulation and social trends. When these six factors indicate rising business risk, even a dollar of debt may be too much for some companies.

Over the past four decades, many companies have struggled with the wrong capital structures. During cycles of credit expansion, companies have often failed to build enough liquidity to survive the inevitable contractions. Especially vulnerable are enterprises with unpredictable revenue streams that end up with too much debt during business slowdowns. It happened 40 years ago, it happened 20 years ago, and it’s happening again.

Overleveraging in many industries — especially airlines, aerospace and technology — started in the late 1960s. As the perceived risk of investing in such businesses grew in the 1970s, the price at which their debt securities traded fell sharply. But by using the capital markets to deleverage — by paying off these securities at lower, discounted prices through tax-free exchanges of equity for debt, debt for debt, assets for debt and cash for debt — most companies avoided default and saved jobs. (Congress later imposed a tax on the difference between the tax basis of the debt and the discounted price at which it was retired.)

Issuing new equity can of course depress a stock’s value in two ways: It increases the supply, thus lowering the price; and it “signals” that management thinks the stock price is high relative to its true value. Conversely, a company that repurchases some of its own stock signals an undervalued stock. Buying stock back, the theory goes, will reduce the supply and increase the price. Dozens of finance students have earned Ph.D.s by describing such signaling dynamics. But history has shown that both theories about lowering and raising stock prices are wrong with regard to deleveraging by companies that are seen as credit risks.

Two recent examples are Alcoa and Johnson Controls each of which saw its stock price increase sharply after a new equity issue last month. This has happened repeatedly over the past 40 years. When a company uses the proceeds from issuance of stock or an equity-linked security to deleverage by paying off debt, the perception of credit risk declines, and the stock price generally rises.

The decision to increase or decrease leverage depends on market conditions and investors’ receptivity to debt. The period from the late-1970s to the mid-1980s generally favored debt financing. Then, in the late ’80s, equity market values rose above the replacement costs of such balance-sheet assets as plants and equipment for the first time in 15 years. It was a signal to deleverage.

In this decade, many companies, financial institutions and governments again started to overleverage, a concern we noted in several Milken Institute forums. Along with others, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, we also pointed out that when companies reduce fixed obligations through asset exchanges, any tax on the discount ultimately costs jobs. Congress responded in the recent stimulus bill by deferring the tax for five years and spreading the liability over an additional five years. As a result, companies have already moved to repurchase or exchange more than $100 billion in debt to strengthen their balance sheets. That has helped save jobs.

The new law is also helpful for companies that made the mistake of buying back their stock with new debt or cash in the years before the market’s recent fall. These purchases peaked at more than $700 billion in 2007 near the market top — and in many cases, the value of the repurchased stock has dropped by more than half and has led to ratings downgrades. Particularly hard hit were some of the world’s largest companies (i.e., General Electric, AIG, Merrill Lynch); financial institutions (Hartford Financial, Lincoln National, Washington Mutual); retailers (Macy’s, Home Depot); media companies (CBS, Gannett); and industrial manufacturers (Eastman Kodak, Motorola, Xerox).

Without stock buybacks, many such companies would have little debt and would have greater flexibility during this period of increased credit constraints. In other words, their current financial problems are self-imposed. Instead of entering the recession with adequate liquidity and less debt with long maturities, they had the wrong capital structure for the time.

The current recession started in real estate, just as in 1974. Back then, many real-estate investment trusts lost as much as 90% of their value in less than a year because they were too highly leveraged and too dependent on commercial paper at a time when interest rates were doubling. This time around it was a combination of excessive leverage in real-estate-related financial instruments, a serious lowering of underwriting standards, and ratings that bore little relationship to reality. The experience of both periods highlights two fallacies that seem to recur in 20-year cycles: that any loan to real estate is a good loan, and that property values always rise. Fact: Over the past 120 years, home prices have declined about 40% of the time.

History isn’t a sine wave of endlessly repeated patterns. It’s more like a helix that brings similar events around in a different orbit. But what we see today does echo the 1970s, as companies use the capital markets to push out debt maturities and pay off loans. That gives them breathing room and provides hope that history will repeat itself in a strong economic recovery.

It doesn’t matter whether a company is big or small. Capital structure matters. It always has and always will.

Mr. Milken is chairman of the Milken Institute.

 

Doug Kass has a terrific track record of predicting the tops and bottoms of recent markets.  He has been known as a short seller the past several years as he thought the market over-valued.  Now, however, he has picked March 5, 2009 as the bottom and has gone long.  He was nearly alone in his convictions on that date, but has recently been joined by more and more investors, including yours truly.  Why does Kass think we have reached the bottom of this Bear?  Read on for more:

http://www.seabreezepartners.net/newsArticle.asp?id=449

March 24, 2009

Why the Bears Are Wrong
By Doug Kass, The Edge

I continue to believe that the early March low represented a yearly and, quite possibly, a generational market bottom.

The mustard seeds for the economy and the U.S. stock market have begun to take root.  The rate of change in 10 of 12 factors in my watch list are improving.

On Feb. 17, I presented a watch list of conditions that, if in an improving trend, would likely indicate that a sustainable up move is possible for equities.

It is time to review this checklist (and add one more factor) to determine the market’s standing. Our new grades and those of two weeks ago are in parentheses and will be updated in the weeks and months ahead.

1. 1. Bank balance sheets must be recapitalized. Yesterday a comprehensive bank rescue package was introduced. It is obviously too early to consider its full impact, but the details of the program suggest to this observer that it will likely be effective in clearing toxic bank assets. (We grade the package a B+, up from a D+ only two weeks ago.)
   2. Bank lending must be restored. While bank lending standards remain tight, my view is that yesterday’s announcement of ring-fencing toxic bank assets will almost unquestionably succeed in unclogging the transmission of credit. (Grade B, up from a c previously.)
   3. Financial stocks’ performance must improve. Financial stocks have finally awakened from the dead, and the recent outsized move to the upside could foreshadow continued market strength. Historically strong relative performance in the shares of asset managers — such as Franklin Resources (BEN), T. Rowe Price (TROW) and AllianceBernstein (AB) — presage a better equity market, and Monday’s strong group action was conspicuous in its outperformance. (Grade B+, up from a D.)
   4. Commodity prices must rise as a confirmation of worldwide economic growth. Beginning two weeks ago, commodities’ prices began to strengthen, and the Fed’s message last week accelerated that trend. Gold, copper (at the highest level since November) and crude oil (over $54 a barrel) continued to rise yesterday, reflecting a combination of continuing inflationary and currency debasement fears coupled with the possibility that worldwide economic growth might stabilize sooner than later. Finally, the TIPS market is forecasting some higher inflation, and a little inflation is better than a lot of deflation. (Grade B, up from a C+.)
   5. Credit spreads and credit availability must improve. Spreads remain worrisome and the transmission of credit remains poor, but the economy should gain traction as public policy is implemented, money is made more available and lending terms are liberalized. (Grade D, flat from two weeks ago).
   6. We need evidence of a bottom in the economy, housing markets and housing prices. As I have written, the retail industry has exhibited evidence of sequential improvement in the January through March period. Other economic signs are somewhat more ambiguous but, nevertheless, are showing some life. Months of inventory of unsold homes are declining and so are mortgage rates, but home prices have yet to stabilize despite an improvement in the affordability indices and a better relationship between home ownership and rental costs. Nevertheless, yesterday’s strong existing homes sales release raises the specter of a better spring selling season than most anticipate. I contend that housing could surprise to the upside and might lead most other economic indicators higher. (Grade C+, up from a C-.)
   7. We need evidence of more favorable reactions to disappointing earnings and weak guidance. I am encouraged by the better price action in the face of poor earnings results and guidance in a wide range of companies, including Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold (FCX), FedEx (FDX), Airgas (ARG) and General Electric (GE). (Grade B+, up from a C+.)
   8. Emerging markets must improve. China’s economy (PMI and retail sales) and the performance of its year-to-date stock market have turned decidedly more constructive, but other emerging markets remain moribund. (Grade B up from a C.)
   9. Market volatility must decline. The world’s stock markets remain more volatile than a Mexican jumping bean. (Grade C+, flat with two weeks ago.)
   10. Hedge fund and mutual fund redemptions must ease. I am comfortable writing that the worst of the redemptions are behind the asset management industry. Nevertheless, the disintermediation and disarray in the hedge fund and fund of fund industries still have a ways to go. And while brokerage account liquidations appeared to have decelerated last week (coincident with rising share prices), my high net worth brokerage contacts (such as Baron Von Broker) continue to experience account closures and a panicked constituency. (Grade C, up from a D).
   11. Marginal buyers must emerge. Low invested positions at hedge funds and by individual investors no doubt fueled March’s market rise as the fear of being out has begun to replace the fear of being in. These two classes could continue to be the near-term marginal buyers fueling stocks. Corporate acquirers could also emerge as important marginal buyers, and the recent step up in merger and acquisition activity — for example, Genentech (DNA), Petro-Canada (PCZ), Schering-Plough (SGP) and Daimler (DAI) — is a concrete indicator that another important marginal buyer has surfaced. As the year progresses, a meaningful upside move awaits a broad asset allocation move of pension funds out of fixed income and into equities. (Grade B, up from a C.) To the above factors, I am adding a 12 factor in my watch list:
   12. The market’s internals must improve. I am comforted by a number of improving technical conditions that have emerged since the March low and that have continued in force over the past two weeks since the market has made program off that nadir. Indeed, the conditions of the recent low were different than others — in sentiment, volume, number of new lows and in intensity. The move from the October lows to the March lows indicated growing fear and gave way to rising cash positions and the loss of hope, but the market’s internals were improving. November’s DJIA low of 7,552 was nearly 11% below the October low of 8,451, and the March low of 6,547 was 22.5% under October’s low. While each new low was more frightening than the prior one, however, there were improving technical and sentiment signals. For example, NYSE volume at the October low expanded to 2.85 billion shares; at the November low, volume dropped to 2.23 billion shares; and at the March low, volume was only 1.56 billion shares. As well, new lows traced decreasing levels: At the October low, there were 2,900 new lows; at the November low, there were 1,515 lows; and at the March low, there were only 855 new lows on the NYSE. Moreover, the combination of last Tuesday’s 12:1 ratio of advancing stocks over declining stocks coupled with that day’s 27:1 up-to-down volume ratio has not occurred in almost 65 years. Remarkably, yesterday was the fifth 90% upside day in March, which is evidence of a broadening market.

In summary, 10 out of 12 factors (including our newest, market internals) on my watch list are in an improving mode. Though many variables are currently accorded relatively low grades and the outlook remains debatable, the delta (rate of change) in almost my entire watch list is improving and flashing a green light for the U.S. stock market.

A classical wall of worry is being reinforced by an overwhelming consensus that the recent advance was a bear market rally. Moreover, the negative “chatter,” as Jim “El Capitan” Cramer describes it, appears loosely constructed and fails to credibly argue against the salutary effect that $4 trillion of stimulus will have on the domestic economy.

Based on the 12 considerations comprising my watch list, I respectfully disagree with the prevailing negative consensus, most of whose members failed to properly analyze the cracks in the foundation of credit, in the economy and in equities two years ago. Indeed, it remains my view that the fear of further investment losses and possible investor redemptions are clouding many managers’ objectivity in assessing the markets.

In the fullness of time, public policy aimed at stimulating the economy (in general) and in housing (in particular) should bear fruit, as will the ring-fencing of toxic bank assets serve to unclog the transmission of credit.

While it is unrealistic to expect a straight up move, I am growing increasingly confident in my variant and optimistic view that the early March low was not only a yearly low but, quite possibly, a generational low.

Coming Monday, March 30:  Jeremy Grantham 1st Quarter Commentary

I have spent some time during recent days in remorse. “How did I not see all of this coming and get into cash?”, I ask myself. But I am being unfair to myself, because I did see all of this coming, but could not bring myself to believe that it would actually happen or pull the trigger to sell out and get 100% into cash.

I looked to see what I was saying in January 2004, and low and behold, I thought all of this was a possibility, though in early 2004 I did not yet fully appreciate how much the real estate bubble would affect the future. By the end of 2005, I understood that was the true danger. But if our financial system was not so inherently weak prior to that bubble, it would not have brought the system down. Looking back on this advice, it sounds as relevant today, as it did almost five years ago.

Here is what I said in my annual letter, January 2004:

REAL ASSETS

This category was not mentioned in previous reports, but is an area of great interest. The base materials (natural resources) markets have outperformed many equities and all bonds in 2003. Gold, like oil and other natural resources, has reversed a 25 year downtrend. This is very significant. It was only two years ago that many central banks decided to liquidate gold reserves, pressuring prices with the anticipation of increased supplies. Now, gold has gone from $250, to well over $400/oz. in 18 months. What does this mean? Is it a portent of things to come? Gold has been the “Anti-dollar” since 1971, when the USA (and by extension, any central bank with currency linked to the dollar) went off the gold standard and onto a paper based standard (the USD). Gold prices went from $35 in 1971 and eventually to $850 in 1980, during the height of inflation. Then as now, gold strengthens when the dollar (and other paper currency) weakens, as gold is the alternate form of world financial exchange.

Gold and other commodity prices are considered by many economists to be predictors of future inflation. Inflation is created by excess debt leading to declining currency valuation. If government and consumer debt and money supply is again in excess, then inflation and declining purchase power of the USD is on the way (Boy, sure got this one right!!). The deficit spending of the past 3 years rivals the late 60s, during Johnson’s “Guns and Butter” program, as a percent of GNP. But the story is really worse this time. Unlike the 60s, when the USA was still the world’s creditor nation coming out of World War 2, with positive balance of trade, now, the USA has severely negative balance of trade. Continued build up of national and personal debt is doubly troublesome. Unlike the 1970s, now have nothing to offset our debt, except more paper.

Potential “Doomsday” scenarios come out of this ominous situation. At best, as hoped for by me, the large national debt will result in a price inflation, a stagnant economy, flat stock market, and declining bond prices in concert with increasing interest rates. See the 1970s for an example. I believe this is what the Fed is now trying to engineer: dollar devaluation and price inflation. The dollar devaluation makes exports more attractive and imports less attractive, helping our trade balance. Price inflation reduces the impact of long-term debt for both government and consumer at the expense of the creditors: mortgage holders in the case of consumer debt and foreigners in the case of government Treasury bonds.

In the worst case scenario, the dollar’s value will disintegrate taking the USA and many other dollar-denominated economies with, leading to a global financial crisis and depression that could last for 10 or more years. From this depression will emerge a new global financial power, China, which would de-link its currency from the USD, and make the China Yuan as the new global currency standard. As the new creditor power, replacing the USA role from the 50s and 60s, China will dictate world policy.

The end result of these concerns is the need to own either commodities in the form of mining, energy or other natural resource companies, and rare metals: gold, silver, platinum, etc, in certificate or in fact.

Energy stocks are another commodity that would do well in an international financial crisis. Asia (China) continues to increase consumption of energy products, like oil and coal. Supply is limited and requires years of effort to expand. Commodities will also do well during a period of global inflation, or deflation, as during the 30s. Raw material values may not increase in absolute terms during periods of deflation, but they do not decrease much, either. So, if currencies increase in value, as they do during a period of deflation, then commodities appreciate in relative terms.