There has been much hand-wringing over Dubai and other countries and their sovereign debt problems since the end of November.  There is a fear that the exposure of this debt might be the tip of the iceberg.  It is feared that the government debt crisis will spread from the small and traditionally weak and underfunded economies of Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland (the PIIGS) to the more substantial and traditionally strong economies of France, Germany, Japan and the United States bringing with it the fear of a global sovereign debt melt-down.  This opinion is emotional and uninformed

All the "sovereign debt default" talk about Dubai, Greece and Spain is old news that is just now getting press because what was already in motion at the top of the debt bubble in 2007 is finally coming to fruition.  Now that the commercial bank crisis has been for the most part averted, the sovereign debt issues that are closely related come to the fore. The Dubai problems were obvious two years ago or more. And Abu Dhabi and other UAE brethren have little patience for the profligacy of Dubai. They will backstop Dubai only after those who overextended get taken out. Then they will ride to the rescue and take control of many of the assets.

Same thing in Spain or Greece. Spain dug itself a deep hole by committing significant debt to aggressive expansion of public works, most notably the 3GW solar power expansion.  The EU will backstop those countries, but only at a price. It is in no one's interest to let the fire burn out of control. I compare this to hot spots after a forest fire. If they don't threaten to flare up and ignite new fires, you let them die out on their own.  Other times you douse them (with financial liquidity in this case) to put them out before they spread. If the infection spreads to Japan, that would be a much more serious event than Dubai, only because of the size of the Japanese economy and the relative importance of the yen. But I think the global central bank leaders have an eye on this and will prevent a Japanese economic collapse. As long as all major economies pull together, there is no reason to think we will have a financial calamity. Economic collapses require the public to panic (and stop spending). Panic is totally a psychological phenomena and can only be brought about by careless or reckless political actions (or inactions).

It is very important to note that the countries that are in danger of defaulting, are not key world economies. The talk of a major economic power like Germany, Japan or the USA being forced into insolvency is from someone ignorant of what it takes to force a financial default. Defaults don't just happen, they are initiated by a creditor. If the debtor is large enough as compared to the creditor, then it is non-sensical or impossible for the creditor to force the default. The punishment will fall as much or more on the creditor as compared to the debtor. To force a smaller debtor to default, though, makes sense. Assets can be seized and held or resold to recoup the investment. Just who would force the USA, Germany or Japan into default? Who could gain? Who could manage the assets that were forfeited for the debt? There is no private money (hedge funds, ala John Paulsen) with the size to force a large sovereign to default.  China is the only creditor nation with the size to force such a default. But China won't do it because it would be suicidal. China, the creditor, needs the developed world as much as the debtors need China and other developing, export-driven creditor nations. It is totally symbiotic, or co-dependent if one wants to be cynical about the situation.

To make my point about the relative size of creditors and debtors as it relates to default: I just made a good return recently on General Growth Properties (GGWPQ.pk) because I understood this dynamic. GGP was in technical default because of the financial crisis and its inability to roll forward short term debt taken on during the two to three years prior to the financial collapse. It was / is still cash flow positive and can cover the costs of its interest obligations, much like sovereigns with their ongoing ability to raise revenue from tax.  But GGP wisely had filed for bankruptcy as a single entity and had pulled all its various mall properties under the single corporate parent umbrella. This made GGP in effect, too big to fail. No single creditor had the legal power to force all the properties into a firesale. The court (Judge Gropper) saw it the same way and made the decision to force the parties to work out the mortgagtes (to refinance). When the creditors found out they were not going to be able to drive a hard bargain and take away the mortgaged property for much less than market value, they had to deal. Now GGP is close to exiting bankruptcy with all its property intact.

Even though sovereigns are unlikely to default in a cascading way, the global economy still remains weak.  It will take consumers and businesses a long time to regain their confidence to buy and bankers to lend.  For the overall American market, from this point on, the economy must improve significantly to get the SP500 much above 1200. But I think that is the higher probability over the next year or two as compared to a melt-down. Politically, I think President Obama is finding out that it isn't prudent to be too anti-business. He seems to have finally gotten the point that the top priority is jobs. Health care and environment are lower priority since there is no money to pay for them if we don't have near full employment and full tax revenues. We aren't hearing too much health care talk from the Admin or Congress the past 2-3 weeks. To demonstrate his new-found love for business, Obama just had T-Sec Geithner spell out the capital gains tax freeze and investment tax credits for 2010. This will help jump start business and improve consumer sentiment as people start getting jobs.

As Obama and other world government leaders turn their attention towards restarting business, the world economy will heal and the markets will respond. Asian stock markets might be a little overdone just because of being the crowded trade, so I have backed off on them, for now. I have moved almost everything back to domestic large cap stocks or energy / commodities. I think 2010 will be a "consolidation" year with only a little index movement, maybe from 1100 to 1250. 2011 might be a similar year, with gradual improvement from 1250 to 1400. That would get us back to May 2008 which was about where the final dive started (down to 666). Maybe we pull back 100 points (10-12%) somewhere in the next 2-3 years. But by 2014 we can pass 1550 and set new highs, if the government continues to be supportive of business and doesn't get too radical (seems more likely right now than 6 months ago).

I am buying up some of the banks that look like they are turning the corner and will be survivors. I have a bunch of the leveraged financial index, UYG, which is weighted towards the survivors like GS, JPM or WFC. But I also am buying some BAC now (as of two weeks ago). Even Citi might be a buy at this point, now that they have a plan to exit TARP. But I am passing on them for now.

Otherwise, my theme is Tech, commodities, energy and materials. Tech is due for a positive replacement / upgrade cycle after 10 years of being down.  Microsoft's (MSFT) Windows 7 should be the catalyst in 2010 once the IT budgets are approved. Just buy the XLK if you don't have any favorites. SMH is the semicon index which has more beta than the XLK. My favorites in commodities tend to the miners and energy stocks, though I have recently picked up some Potash (POT).  I also have call options on (FCX) and (BHP).  This is a better way to play the weak dollar trade than gold, in my book, as operating leverage contributes to performance and generates cash flow which actually has value to an investor.  They have all outperformed Gold in 2009.  Commodities and Energy will benefit from the global economic expansion that is the natural reaction to the collapse. I find it interesting that Suncor (SU) was going up the last two days while oil futures are going down. I find that a very positive sign. I have really loaded up on Pennwest (PWE) and Provident Energy (PVX) .

Tags: Aggressive Expansion, BAC, Backstop, Bank Crisis, BHP, Debt Bubble, Debt Crisis, Debt Default, Debt Issues, Debt Problems, Deep Hole, Deflation, Depression, Dubai, FCX, Forest Fire, Germany Japan, GGWPQ.PK, Global Economy, Government Debt, Greece, Greece Italy, GS, Ireland, Italy, Japan And The United States, Japanese Economy, JPM, PIIGS, Portugal, Portugal Spain, POT, Power Expansion, Profligacy, pvx, PWE, SMH, Sovereign Debt, Spain, su, XLK

One thing about Doug Kass, is that he is willing to stick his neck out. But it sure seems he will get it cut off this time. I don't know why he says that the advance is narrowing; instead, I see that it is rotating and broadening which is very bullish as sectors left behind are now beginning to catch up. If the break above 1000 on the SPY holds, as it did today, for another couple days (William O'Neil of IBD says 4 days are needed to confirm a breakout), it will probably head up to 1100 on its way to 1300. I don't know if it can get there by year end, but there are some that do.

Leadership is narrowing, speculative stocks are erupting, and shorts are pulling their hair out.~I still say the advance has a relatively small and finite life now....

A burgeoning fiscal deficit and the financial instability of our state and local municipalities are among two of the most significant of a number of nontraditional headwinds that consumers, corporations and investors face in the future. Though the bulls generally agree with these intermediate-term challenges (especially the spiraling deficit and a nervous U.S. dollar stalemate), they generally dismiss them both over the short term, favoring the belief that the current upside surprises in earnings will dominate the market landscape in influence.

I would argue that the aforementioned challenges are ever more predictable in consequence and will serve as a governor to further gains in market valuations. Not only are they inhibiting but they are also potentially oppressive influences that have been too readily put on the back burner in the face of a relentless market advance over the last five months.

An avalanche of spending by the public sector is now following an avalanche of spending by the private sector. In essence, we are (perhaps necessarily) fighting the slowdown with the same sort of incendiary kerosene that put us into the mess.

Profligate spending comes at a cost, a cost that we will experience sooner than later.  -  Doug Kass, August 3, 2009

There was a big move in financials and RE the past two days. Industrials are also perking up (I made a quick profit on Fluor, but would now like to get a little more before earnings on Monday). GE is both an industrial and a financial, so it has done very nicely the past 10 days, going from $12 to $14, which is almost a 20% move. I am adding to GE. Its 200 day EMA is 14.93 and if it breaks that barrier, I see it going to $20. I am using call options to add to my position (GEWLA). I also sold the Sept $17 puts today for $3.10.

Another stock to look at is the ETF for industrials: XLI. I sold puts on that today, but would also look at buying the stock or buying calls. Industrials are early cyclicals and are just now starting to move. Rather than buy BAC, I am adding to UYG by purchasing March 2010 calls at the $6 strike. UYG has a lot of BAC in it, plus the other big financial names like JPM, WFC and USB. They are at $0.70 a contract right now. If UYG goes to $10 by Jan. 1 (it was $20 last Sept), the return will be $3 on a $0.70 investment per share, which is a 400% return. But if it goes to $10, I will probably hold it till expiration because I think it might go back up to $20 while BAC is moving from $15 to $30.

Kass is stuck on his huge multi-year trading range theme (800 - 1000 on the SP500), just like Bill Gross. But if the Feds continue to support the economy and the Asian market continues its great growth and puts demand on our exports, there is no reason that the RE sector can't repair itself and unemployment can't move back down to around 6-7% over the next 12-18 months. That will ruin the bear arguments and will support a 1300 market as earnings continue to come back.

Keep an eye on the Feds. They are most important in the next 12 months in the market.

Tags: BAC, Doug Kass, Financials, FLR, Fluor, GE, Industrials, JPM, Real Estate, USB, UYG, WFC, XLI

Warren Buffett spoke today, to the fabulous Julia Boorstin of CNBC (what great hair she has!). I don't particularly care for Buffett's politics and his ideas on taxation. But when it comes to economics and business prospects, Buffett is without match, as his investing record shows.

I agree entirely with him about the outlook for our economy the next few years. He makes the statement: "I don't know if the movie is 2 or 4 hours long, but I know it has a happy ending". What a positive point of view. More of us should share that perspective.

I am piggy-backing on many of Buffett's trades since late 2008 owning: GE, WFC, USB and GS.   These are all global franchises that for the most part, came through the crash without much damage (GE is much healthier than its stock price suggests and is a raging bargain).

Regarding the housing crisis and home building, Buffett makes the point that the housing crisis precipitated our economic crisis (but he did not lay the blame properly at the feet of a laissez faire Congress that eliminated the regulatory protections needed and cheerled the mortgage industry into the ground).  His medicine: don't build any more houses; a little simplistic, but maybe tongue in cheek.  We need to work off the inventory we already have. I think that is pretty obvious and goes without saying. But he said it by way of making the case that excess housing is the root of our problems and our economy won't truly mend until housing inventories are once again in balance.

Without saying any more, here is the interview:

Tags: 2009 predictions, BAC, Buffett, GE, GS, Home building, Julia Boorstin, UBS, Warren Buffett, WFC

Just six months ago, at the bottom of the financial crisis during the darkest days of October and November 2008, it was unclear whether the American banking industry would survive.  Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG had already been effectively nationalized (more than 80% of stock owned by the Feds) and Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and others appeared to be on the doorstep of investor-owned demise. 

Now, in May 2009, the world seems a much better place for bankers and the rest of us that use bank money.   I for one, don't think banks will lead the market higher, but they need to at least regain their health and participate in the economy for growth to happen.  It seems they are on their way.  BAC, one of the sickest of the surviving banks, successfully sold over 1 billion shares after hours on Tuesday to close the gap on its capital needs according to the government "Stress Test". 

Dick Bove, who has been a lone voice for the survival of the banking industry, sees a very bright future for BAC, at least as compared to now.  He came public Monday with a statement that he expects BAC earnings to normalize around $4 per share, even after dilution, within the next 2-3 years.  Applying a 10-12 multiple to earnings, this implies a $40-48 future share price as compared to the $12 today. See his comments towards the end of the embedded news clip.

A great way to play the banks over the next few years is UYG, the leveraged ETF of the financial index.  UYG is today comprised mainly of the superior banks such as JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo, but BAC also has a place on this index.  Barrons posted an article on options trading strategies for BAC stock that might provide some ideas to capitalize on the return of the banks:

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB124265990717130781.html

Tags: BAC, banks, Barrons, C, Dick Bove, ETF, Fannie Mae, Fed, Financial, Financial Crisis, FRE, Freddie Mac, Gold, Goldman Sachs, GS, JP Morgan, UYG, Wells Fargo

Some of you may remember Michael Milken.  He was The Bad Boy from the 1980s leveraged buyout (LBO) craze and the father of modern junk bond debt financing to conduct LBOs.  He ran the Drexel Burnham Lambert high yield bond desk until 1989 at which point, he ran it into the ground and in 1990, DBL out of business.  For this and other mischief and overreaching, he earned himself a one-way ticket to Federal prison for SEC violations in his dealings with client and fellow Bad Boy, Ivan Boesky.  Milken served a two year prison sentence and apparently came back a changed and philanthropic man.

So, if anyone can speak with authority on the national bond market and what it means to business, it should be Michael Milken.  How refreshing he has turned his formidable analytical powers to helping the rest of us understand the bond market. 

Today (Tuesday, August 21)  in the WSJ, Milken published an editorial on the corporate bond market drawing parallels to the mid 1970s.  Those of you that are loyal "Wealth-Ed" readers know that I am of the opinion that history is a prelude to the future, that is history (almost) repeats.  I have also noted the market similarities between now and the mid 1970s as well as the late 1930s.   Milken puts some specific analysis behind that speculation.

In Milken's opinion, we are working through the worst of times and not far from much better times.  I have been recommending investments in the high yield bond market as the spreads (TED spread) between high yield and Treasuries were until recently at record levels.  The fact those spreads are improving shows healing in the market.  The bond market almost always gets the story right before the stock market.  So an improving high yield market is a good indicator for stocks and the economy.

• OPINION
• APRIL 21, 2009

Why Capital Structure Matters

Companies that repurchased stock

By MICHAEL MILKEN

Thirty-five years ago business publications were writing that major money-center banks would fail, and quoted investors who said, "I'll never own a stock again!" Meanwhile, some state and local governments as well as utilities seemed on the brink of collapse. Corporate debt often sold for pennies on the dollar while profitable, growing companies were starved for capital.

Chad Crowe

If that all sounds familiar today, it's worth remembering that 1974 was also a turning point. With financial institutions weakened by the recession, public and private markets began displacing banks as the source of most corporate financing. Bonds rallied strongly in 1975-76, providing underpinning for the stock market, which rose 75%. Some high-yield funds achieved unleveraged, two-year rates of return approaching 100%.

The accessibility of capital markets has grown continuously since 1974. Businesses are not as dependent on banks, which now own less than a third of the loans they originate. In the first quarter of 2009, many corporations took advantage of low absolute levels of interest rates to raise $840 billion in the global bond market. That's 100% more than in the first quarter of 2008, and is a typical increase at this stage of a market cycle. Just as in the 1974 recession, investment-grade companies have started to reliquify. Once that happens, the market begins to open for lower-rated bonds. Thus BB- and B-rated corporations are now raising capital through new issues of equity, debt and convertibles.

This cyclical process today appears to be where it was in early 1975, when balance sheets began to improve and corporations with strong capital structures started acquiring others. In a single recent week, Roche raised more than $40 billion in the public markets to help finance its merger with Genentech. Other companies such as Altria, HCA, Staples and Dole Foods, have used bond proceeds to pay off short-term bank debt, strengthening their balance sheets and helping restore bank liquidity. These new corporate bond issues have provided investors with positive returns this year even as other asset groups declined.

The late Nobel laureate Merton Miller and I, although good friends, long debated whether this kind of capital-structure management is an essential job of corporate leaders. Miller believed that capital structure was not important in valuing a company's securities or the risk of investing in them.

My belief -- first stated 40 years ago in a graduate thesis and later confirmed by experience -- is that capital structure significantly affects both value and risk. The optimal capital structure evolves constantly, and successful corporate leaders must constantly consider six factors -- the company and its management, industry dynamics, the state of capital markets, the economy, government regulation and social trends. When these six factors indicate rising business risk, even a dollar of debt may be too much for some companies.

Over the past four decades, many companies have struggled with the wrong capital structures. During cycles of credit expansion, companies have often failed to build enough liquidity to survive the inevitable contractions. Especially vulnerable are enterprises with unpredictable revenue streams that end up with too much debt during business slowdowns. It happened 40 years ago, it happened 20 years ago, and it's happening again.

Overleveraging in many industries -- especially airlines, aerospace and technology -- started in the late 1960s. As the perceived risk of investing in such businesses grew in the 1970s, the price at which their debt securities traded fell sharply. But by using the capital markets to deleverage -- by paying off these securities at lower, discounted prices through tax-free exchanges of equity for debt, debt for debt, assets for debt and cash for debt -- most companies avoided default and saved jobs. (Congress later imposed a tax on the difference between the tax basis of the debt and the discounted price at which it was retired.)

Issuing new equity can of course depress a stock's value in two ways: It increases the supply, thus lowering the price; and it "signals" that management thinks the stock price is high relative to its true value. Conversely, a company that repurchases some of its own stock signals an undervalued stock. Buying stock back, the theory goes, will reduce the supply and increase the price. Dozens of finance students have earned Ph.D.s by describing such signaling dynamics. But history has shown that both theories about lowering and raising stock prices are wrong with regard to deleveraging by companies that are seen as credit risks.

Two recent examples are Alcoa and Johnson Controls each of which saw its stock price increase sharply after a new equity issue last month. This has happened repeatedly over the past 40 years. When a company uses the proceeds from issuance of stock or an equity-linked security to deleverage by paying off debt, the perception of credit risk declines, and the stock price generally rises.

The decision to increase or decrease leverage depends on market conditions and investors' receptivity to debt. The period from the late-1970s to the mid-1980s generally favored debt financing. Then, in the late '80s, equity market values rose above the replacement costs of such balance-sheet assets as plants and equipment for the first time in 15 years. It was a signal to deleverage.

In this decade, many companies, financial institutions and governments again started to overleverage, a concern we noted in several Milken Institute forums. Along with others, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, we also pointed out that when companies reduce fixed obligations through asset exchanges, any tax on the discount ultimately costs jobs. Congress responded in the recent stimulus bill by deferring the tax for five years and spreading the liability over an additional five years. As a result, companies have already moved to repurchase or exchange more than $100 billion in debt to strengthen their balance sheets. That has helped save jobs.

The new law is also helpful for companies that made the mistake of buying back their stock with new debt or cash in the years before the market's recent fall. These purchases peaked at more than $700 billion in 2007 near the market top -- and in many cases, the value of the repurchased stock has dropped by more than half and has led to ratings downgrades. Particularly hard hit were some of the world's largest companies (i.e., General Electric, AIG, Merrill Lynch); financial institutions (Hartford Financial, Lincoln National, Washington Mutual); retailers (Macy's, Home Depot); media companies (CBS, Gannett); and industrial manufacturers (Eastman Kodak, Motorola, Xerox).

Without stock buybacks, many such companies would have little debt and would have greater flexibility during this period of increased credit constraints. In other words, their current financial problems are self-imposed. Instead of entering the recession with adequate liquidity and less debt with long maturities, they had the wrong capital structure for the time.

The current recession started in real estate, just as in 1974. Back then, many real-estate investment trusts lost as much as 90% of their value in less than a year because they were too highly leveraged and too dependent on commercial paper at a time when interest rates were doubling. This time around it was a combination of excessive leverage in real-estate-related financial instruments, a serious lowering of underwriting standards, and ratings that bore little relationship to reality. The experience of both periods highlights two fallacies that seem to recur in 20-year cycles: that any loan to real estate is a good loan, and that property values always rise. Fact: Over the past 120 years, home prices have declined about 40% of the time.

History isn't a sine wave of endlessly repeated patterns. It's more like a helix that brings similar events around in a different orbit. But what we see today does echo the 1970s, as companies use the capital markets to push out debt maturities and pay off loans. That gives them breathing room and provides hope that history will repeat itself in a strong economic recovery.

It doesn't matter whether a company is big or small. Capital structure matters. It always has and always will.

Mr. Milken is chairman of the Milken Institute.

 

Tags: 1937, 1970s, Ag, AMS, AU, BAC, banks, Bonds, C, congress, DOW, Drexel Burnham Lambert, economy, Fed, Federal Treasury, Financial, FRE, GE, General Electric, GG, GS, home prices, LBO, MIC, Michael Milken, Milken, money, OR, Recession, Regulation, RIO, ROC, Tory, Wealth-Ed, WSJ