Just six months ago, at the bottom of the financial crisis during the darkest days of October and November 2008, it was unclear whether the American banking industry would survive.  Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG had already been effectively nationalized (more than 80% of stock owned by the Feds) and Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and others appeared to be on the doorstep of investor-owned demise. 

Now, in May 2009, the world seems a much better place for bankers and the rest of us that use bank money.   I for one, don’t think banks will lead the market higher, but they need to at least regain their health and participate in the economy for growth to happen.  It seems they are on their way.  BAC, one of the sickest of the surviving banks, successfully sold over 1 billion shares after hours on Tuesday to close the gap on its capital needs according to the government “Stress Test”. 

Dick Bove, who has been a lone voice for the survival of the banking industry, sees a very bright future for BAC, at least as compared to now.  He came public Monday with a statement that he expects BAC earnings to normalize around $4 per share, even after dilution, within the next 2-3 years.  Applying a 10-12 multiple to earnings, this implies a $40-48 future share price as compared to the $12 today. See his comments towards the end of the embedded news clip.

A great way to play the banks over the next few years is UYG, the leveraged ETF of the financial index.  UYG is today comprised mainly of the superior banks such as JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo, but BAC also has a place on this index.  Barrons posted an article on options trading strategies for BAC stock that might provide some ideas to capitalize on the return of the banks:

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB124265990717130781.html

Some of you may remember Michael Milken.  He was The Bad Boy from the 1980s leveraged buyout (LBO) craze and the father of modern junk bond debt financing to conduct LBOs.  He ran the Drexel Burnham Lambert high yield bond desk until 1989 at which point, he ran it into the ground and in 1990, DBL out of business.  For this and other mischief and overreaching, he earned himself a one-way ticket to Federal prison for SEC violations in his dealings with client and fellow Bad Boy, Ivan Boesky.  Milken served a two year prison sentence and apparently came back a changed and philanthropic man.

So, if anyone can speak with authority on the national bond market and what it means to business, it should be Michael Milken.  How refreshing he has turned his formidable analytical powers to helping the rest of us understand the bond market. 

Today (Tuesday, August 21)  in the WSJ, Milken published an editorial on the corporate bond market drawing parallels to the mid 1970s.  Those of you that are loyal “Wealth-Ed” readers know that I am of the opinion that history is a prelude to the future, that is history (almost) repeats.  I have also noted the market similarities between now and the mid 1970s as well as the late 1930s.   Milken puts some specific analysis behind that speculation.

In Milken’s opinion, we are working through the worst of times and not far from much better times.  I have been recommending investments in the high yield bond market as the spreads (TED spread) between high yield and Treasuries were until recently at record levels.  The fact those spreads are improving shows healing in the market.  The bond market almost always gets the story right before the stock market.  So an improving high yield market is a good indicator for stocks and the economy.

• OPINION
• APRIL 21, 2009

Why Capital Structure Matters

Companies that repurchased stock

By MICHAEL MILKEN

Thirty-five years ago business publications were writing that major money-center banks would fail, and quoted investors who said, “I’ll never own a stock again!” Meanwhile, some state and local governments as well as utilities seemed on the brink of collapse. Corporate debt often sold for pennies on the dollar while profitable, growing companies were starved for capital.

Chad Crowe

If that all sounds familiar today, it’s worth remembering that 1974 was also a turning point. With financial institutions weakened by the recession, public and private markets began displacing banks as the source of most corporate financing. Bonds rallied strongly in 1975-76, providing underpinning for the stock market, which rose 75%. Some high-yield funds achieved unleveraged, two-year rates of return approaching 100%.

The accessibility of capital markets has grown continuously since 1974. Businesses are not as dependent on banks, which now own less than a third of the loans they originate. In the first quarter of 2009, many corporations took advantage of low absolute levels of interest rates to raise $840 billion in the global bond market. That’s 100% more than in the first quarter of 2008, and is a typical increase at this stage of a market cycle. Just as in the 1974 recession, investment-grade companies have started to reliquify. Once that happens, the market begins to open for lower-rated bonds. Thus BB- and B-rated corporations are now raising capital through new issues of equity, debt and convertibles.

This cyclical process today appears to be where it was in early 1975, when balance sheets began to improve and corporations with strong capital structures started acquiring others. In a single recent week, Roche raised more than $40 billion in the public markets to help finance its merger with Genentech. Other companies such as Altria, HCA, Staples and Dole Foods, have used bond proceeds to pay off short-term bank debt, strengthening their balance sheets and helping restore bank liquidity. These new corporate bond issues have provided investors with positive returns this year even as other asset groups declined.

The late Nobel laureate Merton Miller and I, although good friends, long debated whether this kind of capital-structure management is an essential job of corporate leaders. Miller believed that capital structure was not important in valuing a company’s securities or the risk of investing in them.

My belief — first stated 40 years ago in a graduate thesis and later confirmed by experience — is that capital structure significantly affects both value and risk. The optimal capital structure evolves constantly, and successful corporate leaders must constantly consider six factors — the company and its management, industry dynamics, the state of capital markets, the economy, government regulation and social trends. When these six factors indicate rising business risk, even a dollar of debt may be too much for some companies.

Over the past four decades, many companies have struggled with the wrong capital structures. During cycles of credit expansion, companies have often failed to build enough liquidity to survive the inevitable contractions. Especially vulnerable are enterprises with unpredictable revenue streams that end up with too much debt during business slowdowns. It happened 40 years ago, it happened 20 years ago, and it’s happening again.

Overleveraging in many industries — especially airlines, aerospace and technology — started in the late 1960s. As the perceived risk of investing in such businesses grew in the 1970s, the price at which their debt securities traded fell sharply. But by using the capital markets to deleverage — by paying off these securities at lower, discounted prices through tax-free exchanges of equity for debt, debt for debt, assets for debt and cash for debt — most companies avoided default and saved jobs. (Congress later imposed a tax on the difference between the tax basis of the debt and the discounted price at which it was retired.)

Issuing new equity can of course depress a stock’s value in two ways: It increases the supply, thus lowering the price; and it “signals” that management thinks the stock price is high relative to its true value. Conversely, a company that repurchases some of its own stock signals an undervalued stock. Buying stock back, the theory goes, will reduce the supply and increase the price. Dozens of finance students have earned Ph.D.s by describing such signaling dynamics. But history has shown that both theories about lowering and raising stock prices are wrong with regard to deleveraging by companies that are seen as credit risks.

Two recent examples are Alcoa and Johnson Controls each of which saw its stock price increase sharply after a new equity issue last month. This has happened repeatedly over the past 40 years. When a company uses the proceeds from issuance of stock or an equity-linked security to deleverage by paying off debt, the perception of credit risk declines, and the stock price generally rises.

The decision to increase or decrease leverage depends on market conditions and investors’ receptivity to debt. The period from the late-1970s to the mid-1980s generally favored debt financing. Then, in the late ’80s, equity market values rose above the replacement costs of such balance-sheet assets as plants and equipment for the first time in 15 years. It was a signal to deleverage.

In this decade, many companies, financial institutions and governments again started to overleverage, a concern we noted in several Milken Institute forums. Along with others, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, we also pointed out that when companies reduce fixed obligations through asset exchanges, any tax on the discount ultimately costs jobs. Congress responded in the recent stimulus bill by deferring the tax for five years and spreading the liability over an additional five years. As a result, companies have already moved to repurchase or exchange more than $100 billion in debt to strengthen their balance sheets. That has helped save jobs.

The new law is also helpful for companies that made the mistake of buying back their stock with new debt or cash in the years before the market’s recent fall. These purchases peaked at more than $700 billion in 2007 near the market top — and in many cases, the value of the repurchased stock has dropped by more than half and has led to ratings downgrades. Particularly hard hit were some of the world’s largest companies (i.e., General Electric, AIG, Merrill Lynch); financial institutions (Hartford Financial, Lincoln National, Washington Mutual); retailers (Macy’s, Home Depot); media companies (CBS, Gannett); and industrial manufacturers (Eastman Kodak, Motorola, Xerox).

Without stock buybacks, many such companies would have little debt and would have greater flexibility during this period of increased credit constraints. In other words, their current financial problems are self-imposed. Instead of entering the recession with adequate liquidity and less debt with long maturities, they had the wrong capital structure for the time.

The current recession started in real estate, just as in 1974. Back then, many real-estate investment trusts lost as much as 90% of their value in less than a year because they were too highly leveraged and too dependent on commercial paper at a time when interest rates were doubling. This time around it was a combination of excessive leverage in real-estate-related financial instruments, a serious lowering of underwriting standards, and ratings that bore little relationship to reality. The experience of both periods highlights two fallacies that seem to recur in 20-year cycles: that any loan to real estate is a good loan, and that property values always rise. Fact: Over the past 120 years, home prices have declined about 40% of the time.

History isn’t a sine wave of endlessly repeated patterns. It’s more like a helix that brings similar events around in a different orbit. But what we see today does echo the 1970s, as companies use the capital markets to push out debt maturities and pay off loans. That gives them breathing room and provides hope that history will repeat itself in a strong economic recovery.

It doesn’t matter whether a company is big or small. Capital structure matters. It always has and always will.

Mr. Milken is chairman of the Milken Institute.

 

There have been plenty of times recently, where Warren Buffett and I have been at odds. He doesn’t know this, of course, but I have debated Warren long and hard in the comfort of my living room on the one-way medium of my TV.

I have no issue with Buffett’s investing style or results. In fact, I do everything I can to mimick his style and his picks. My disagreements with Warren are political in nature. He was an unabashed supporter of Barak Obama for the past two years. I had great reservations about our then “President-to-be” based on what I perceived was a commitment to an ideology that was unfriendly to our economic system. Those reservations are being borne out. Warren Buffett wrong, at least on the narrow (but very important) point of Obama’s capability of caring for our economy in a time of crisis.

Today, I am vindicated. He came out this morning on a series of interviews on CNBC and indirectly criticized the Administration and the Congress for a lack of focus and cooperation on the most important issue of our time: the Financial Crisis and resultant Depression.

Listening to Warren is more interesting than reading me. So I will use the rest of this post to link the most interesting of his interview segments. There was almost three hours of segments done by Buffett, so if you like hearing what he has to say, you can go to CNBC.com and view them all.

Warren says that no one is immune from the effects of a financial meltdown. Even the wealthy and powerful are frightened at a time like this.

Warren says: “The banks should get back to banking”. I have been beating this drum for months now. We need to reinstate “Glass-Steagall” or something similar, that regulates the banks and separates them from riskier investing businesses. Getting rid of mark-to-market would be a good short term fix.

Warren also talks about what he did wrong the past few months, the mistakes he made. Buffett is always straight up about his errors and that it is part of being an investor. If he can make mistakes, we all should expect and accept them.

I have spent some time during recent days in remorse. “How did I not see all of this coming and get into cash?”, I ask myself. But I am being unfair to myself, because I did see all of this coming, but could not bring myself to believe that it would actually happen or pull the trigger to sell out and get 100% into cash.

I looked to see what I was saying in January 2004, and low and behold, I thought all of this was a possibility, though in early 2004 I did not yet fully appreciate how much the real estate bubble would affect the future. By the end of 2005, I understood that was the true danger. But if our financial system was not so inherently weak prior to that bubble, it would not have brought the system down. Looking back on this advice, it sounds as relevant today, as it did almost five years ago.

Here is what I said in my annual letter, January 2004:

REAL ASSETS

This category was not mentioned in previous reports, but is an area of great interest. The base materials (natural resources) markets have outperformed many equities and all bonds in 2003. Gold, like oil and other natural resources, has reversed a 25 year downtrend. This is very significant. It was only two years ago that many central banks decided to liquidate gold reserves, pressuring prices with the anticipation of increased supplies. Now, gold has gone from $250, to well over $400/oz. in 18 months. What does this mean? Is it a portent of things to come? Gold has been the “Anti-dollar” since 1971, when the USA (and by extension, any central bank with currency linked to the dollar) went off the gold standard and onto a paper based standard (the USD). Gold prices went from $35 in 1971 and eventually to $850 in 1980, during the height of inflation. Then as now, gold strengthens when the dollar (and other paper currency) weakens, as gold is the alternate form of world financial exchange.

Gold and other commodity prices are considered by many economists to be predictors of future inflation. Inflation is created by excess debt leading to declining currency valuation. If government and consumer debt and money supply is again in excess, then inflation and declining purchase power of the USD is on the way (Boy, sure got this one right!!). The deficit spending of the past 3 years rivals the late 60s, during Johnson’s “Guns and Butter” program, as a percent of GNP. But the story is really worse this time. Unlike the 60s, when the USA was still the world’s creditor nation coming out of World War 2, with positive balance of trade, now, the USA has severely negative balance of trade. Continued build up of national and personal debt is doubly troublesome. Unlike the 1970s, now have nothing to offset our debt, except more paper.

Potential “Doomsday” scenarios come out of this ominous situation. At best, as hoped for by me, the large national debt will result in a price inflation, a stagnant economy, flat stock market, and declining bond prices in concert with increasing interest rates. See the 1970s for an example. I believe this is what the Fed is now trying to engineer: dollar devaluation and price inflation. The dollar devaluation makes exports more attractive and imports less attractive, helping our trade balance. Price inflation reduces the impact of long-term debt for both government and consumer at the expense of the creditors: mortgage holders in the case of consumer debt and foreigners in the case of government Treasury bonds.

In the worst case scenario, the dollar’s value will disintegrate taking the USA and many other dollar-denominated economies with, leading to a global financial crisis and depression that could last for 10 or more years. From this depression will emerge a new global financial power, China, which would de-link its currency from the USD, and make the China Yuan as the new global currency standard. As the new creditor power, replacing the USA role from the 50s and 60s, China will dictate world policy.

The end result of these concerns is the need to own either commodities in the form of mining, energy or other natural resource companies, and rare metals: gold, silver, platinum, etc, in certificate or in fact.

Energy stocks are another commodity that would do well in an international financial crisis. Asia (China) continues to increase consumption of energy products, like oil and coal. Supply is limited and requires years of effort to expand. Commodities will also do well during a period of global inflation, or deflation, as during the 30s. Raw material values may not increase in absolute terms during periods of deflation, but they do not decrease much, either. So, if currencies increase in value, as they do during a period of deflation, then commodities appreciate in relative terms.