Doug Kass has a terrific track record of predicting the tops and bottoms of recent markets.  He has been known as a short seller the past several years as he thought the market over-valued.  Now, however, he has picked March 5, 2009 as the bottom and has gone long.  He was nearly alone in his convictions on that date, but has recently been joined by more and more investors, including yours truly.  Why does Kass think we have reached the bottom of this Bear?  Read on for more:

http://www.seabreezepartners.net/newsArticle.asp?id=449

March 24, 2009

Why the Bears Are Wrong
By Doug Kass, The Edge

I continue to believe that the early March low represented a yearly and, quite possibly, a generational market bottom.

The mustard seeds for the economy and the U.S. stock market have begun to take root.  The rate of change in 10 of 12 factors in my watch list are improving.

On Feb. 17, I presented a watch list of conditions that, if in an improving trend, would likely indicate that a sustainable up move is possible for equities.

It is time to review this checklist (and add one more factor) to determine the market's standing. Our new grades and those of two weeks ago are in parentheses and will be updated in the weeks and months ahead.

1. 1. Bank balance sheets must be recapitalized. Yesterday a comprehensive bank rescue package was introduced. It is obviously too early to consider its full impact, but the details of the program suggest to this observer that it will likely be effective in clearing toxic bank assets. (We grade the package a B+, up from a D+ only two weeks ago.)
   2. Bank lending must be restored. While bank lending standards remain tight, my view is that yesterday's announcement of ring-fencing toxic bank assets will almost unquestionably succeed in unclogging the transmission of credit. (Grade B, up from a C previously.)
   3. Financial stocks' performance must improve. Financial stocks have finally awakened from the dead, and the recent outsized move to the upside could foreshadow continued market strength. Historically strong relative performance in the shares of asset managers -- such as Franklin Resources (BEN), T. Rowe Price (TROW) and AllianceBernstein (AB) -- presage a better equity market, and Monday's strong group action was conspicuous in its outperformance. (Grade B+, up from a D.)
   4. Commodity prices must rise as a confirmation of worldwide economic growth. Beginning two weeks ago, commodities' prices began to strengthen, and the Fed's message last week accelerated that trend. Gold, copper (at the highest level since November) and crude oil (over $54 a barrel) continued to rise yesterday, reflecting a combination of continuing inflationary and currency debasement fears coupled with the possibility that worldwide economic growth might stabilize sooner than later. Finally, the TIPS market is forecasting some higher inflation, and a little inflation is better than a lot of deflation. (Grade B, up from a C+.)
   5. Credit spreads and credit availability must improve. Spreads remain worrisome and the transmission of credit remains poor, but the economy should gain traction as public policy is implemented, money is made more available and lending terms are liberalized. (Grade D, flat from two weeks ago).
   6. We need evidence of a bottom in the economy, housing markets and housing prices. As I have written, the retail industry has exhibited evidence of sequential improvement in the January through March period. Other economic signs are somewhat more ambiguous but, nevertheless, are showing some life. Months of inventory of unsold homes are declining and so are mortgage rates, but home prices have yet to stabilize despite an improvement in the affordability indices and a better relationship between home ownership and rental costs. Nevertheless, yesterday's strong existing homes sales release raises the specter of a better spring selling season than most anticipate. I contend that housing could surprise to the upside and might lead most other economic indicators higher. (Grade C+, up from a C-.)
   7. We need evidence of more favorable reactions to disappointing earnings and weak guidance. I am encouraged by the better price action in the face of poor earnings results and guidance in a wide range of companies, including Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold (FCX), FedEx (FDX), Airgas (ARG) and General Electric (GE). (Grade B+, up from a C+.)
   8. Emerging markets must improve. China's economy (PMI and retail sales) and the performance of its year-to-date stock market have turned decidedly more constructive, but other emerging markets remain moribund. (Grade B up from a C.)
   9. Market volatility must decline. The world's stock markets remain more volatile than a Mexican jumping bean. (Grade C+, flat with two weeks ago.)
   10. Hedge fund and mutual fund redemptions must ease. I am comfortable writing that the worst of the redemptions are behind the asset management industry. Nevertheless, the disintermediation and disarray in the hedge fund and fund of fund industries still have a ways to go. And while brokerage account liquidations appeared to have decelerated last week (coincident with rising share prices), my high net worth brokerage contacts (such as Baron Von Broker) continue to experience account closures and a panicked constituency. (Grade C, up from a D).
   11. Marginal buyers must emerge. Low invested positions at hedge funds and by individual investors no doubt fueled March's market rise as the fear of being out has begun to replace the fear of being in. These two classes could continue to be the near-term marginal buyers fueling stocks. Corporate acquirers could also emerge as important marginal buyers, and the recent step up in merger and acquisition activity -- for example, Genentech (DNA), Petro-Canada (PCZ), Schering-Plough (SGP) and Daimler (DAI) -- is a concrete indicator that another important marginal buyer has surfaced. As the year progresses, a meaningful upside move awaits a broad asset allocation move of pension funds out of fixed income and into equities. (Grade B, up from a C.) To the above factors, I am adding a 12 factor in my watch list:
   12. The market's internals must improve. I am comforted by a number of improving technical conditions that have emerged since the March low and that have continued in force over the past two weeks since the market has made program off that nadir. Indeed, the conditions of the recent low were different than others -- in sentiment, volume, number of new lows and in intensity. The move from the October lows to the March lows indicated growing fear and gave way to rising cash positions and the loss of hope, but the market's internals were improving. November's DJIA low of 7,552 was nearly 11% below the October low of 8,451, and the March low of 6,547 was 22.5% under October's low. While each new low was more frightening than the prior one, however, there were improving technical and sentiment signals. For example, NYSE volume at the October low expanded to 2.85 billion shares; at the November low, volume dropped to 2.23 billion shares; and at the March low, volume was only 1.56 billion shares. As well, new lows traced decreasing levels: At the October low, there were 2,900 new lows; at the November low, there were 1,515 lows; and at the March low, there were only 855 new lows on the NYSE. Moreover, the combination of last Tuesday's 12:1 ratio of advancing stocks over declining stocks coupled with that day's 27:1 up-to-down volume ratio has not occurred in almost 65 years. Remarkably, yesterday was the fifth 90% upside day in March, which is evidence of a broadening market.

In summary, 10 out of 12 factors (including our newest, market internals) on my watch list are in an improving mode. Though many variables are currently accorded relatively low grades and the outlook remains debatable, the delta (rate of change) in almost my entire watch list is improving and flashing a green light for the U.S. stock market.

A classical wall of worry is being reinforced by an overwhelming consensus that the recent advance was a bear market rally. Moreover, the negative "chatter," as Jim "El Capitan" Cramer describes it, appears loosely constructed and fails to credibly argue against the salutary effect that $4 trillion of stimulus will have on the domestic economy.

Based on the 12 considerations comprising my watch list, I respectfully disagree with the prevailing negative consensus, most of whose members failed to properly analyze the cracks in the foundation of credit, in the economy and in equities two years ago. Indeed, it remains my view that the fear of further investment losses and possible investor redemptions are clouding many managers' objectivity in assessing the markets.

In the fullness of time, public policy aimed at stimulating the economy (in general) and in housing (in particular) should bear fruit, as will the ring-fencing of toxic bank assets serve to unclog the transmission of credit.

While it is unrealistic to expect a straight up move, I am growing increasingly confident in my variant and optimistic view that the early March low was not only a yearly low but, quite possibly, a generational low.

Coming Monday, March 30:  Jeremy Grantham 1st Quarter Commentary

I have reprinted in total an interview between fund manager Ray Dalio and Barrons. This is the most detailed and well-thought-out description of what is a deflation and how it is repaired that I have seen. It echoes my thoughts and commentary almost verbatim, but with a lot more detail and credibility. Read on to understand what is happening and how we get out. I will put my commentary in brackets[]:

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123396545910358867.html?page=2&page;=sp

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2009 INTERVIEW

Recession? No, It's a D-process, and It Will Be Long

Ray Dalio, Chief Investment Officer,
Bridgewater Associates

By SANDRA WARD

AN INTERVIEW WITH RAY DALIO: This pro sees a long and painful depression.

NOBODY WAS BETTER PREPARED FOR THE GLOBAL market crash than clients of Ray Dalio's Bridgewater Associates and subscribers to its Daily Observations. Dalio, the chief investment officer and all-around guiding light of the global money-management company he founded more than 30 years ago, began sounding alarms in Barron's in the spring of 2007 about the dangers of excessive financial leverage. He counts among his clients world governments and central banks, as well as pension funds and endowments.

"The regulators have to decide how banks will operate. That means they are going to have to nationalize some in some form." No wonder. The Westport, Conn.-based firm, whose analyses of world markets focus on credit and currencies, has produced long-term annual returns, net of fees, averaging 15%.

In the turmoil of 2008, Bridgewater's Pure Alpha 1 fund gained 8.7% net of fees and Pure Alpha 2 delivered 9.4%. Here's what's on his mind now.

Barron's: I can't think of anyone who was earlier in describing the deleveraging and deflationary process that has been happening around the world.

Dalio: Let's call it a "D-process," which is different than a recession, and the only reason that people really don't understand this process is because it happens rarely. Everybody should, at this point, try to understand the depression process by reading about the Great Depression or the Latin American debt crisis or the Japanese experience so that it becomes part of their frame of reference. Most people didn't live through any of those experiences, and what they have gotten used to is the recession dynamic, and so they are quick to presume the recession dynamic. It is very clear to me that we are in a D-process.

Why are you hesitant to emphasize either the words depression or deflation? Why call it a D-process?

Both of those words have connotations associated with them that can confuse the fact that it is a process that people should try to understand.

You can describe a recession as an economic retraction which occurs when the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy normally to fight inflation. The cycle continues until the economy weakens enough to bring down the inflation rate, at which time the Federal Reserve eases monetary policy and produces an expansion. We can make it more complicated, but that is a basic simple description of what recessions are and what we have experienced through the post-World War II period. What you also need is a comparable understanding of what a D-process is and why it is different.

You have made the point that only by understanding the process can you combat the problem. Are you confident that we are doing what's essential to combat deflation and a depression?

The D-process is a disease of sorts that is going to run its course. When I first started seeing the D-process and describing it, it was before it actually started to play out this way. But now you can ask yourself, OK, when was the last time bank stocks went down so much? When was the last time the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, or any central bank, exploded like it has? When was the last time interest rates went to zero, essentially, making monetary policy as we know it ineffective? When was the last time we had deflation?

The answers to those questions all point to times other than the U.S. post-World War II experience. This was the dynamic that occurred in Japan in the '90s, that occurred in Latin America in the '80s, and that occurred in the Great Depression in the '30s. Basically what happens is that after a period of time, economies go through a long-term debt cycle -- a dynamic that is self-reinforcing, in which people finance their spending by borrowing and debts rise relative to incomes and, more accurately, debt-service payments rise relative to incomes. At cycle peaks, assets are bought on leverage at high-enough prices that the cash flows they produce aren't adequate to service the debt. The incomes aren't adequate to service the debt.

Then begins the reversal process, and that becomes self-reinforcing, too. In the simplest sense, the country reaches the point when it needs a debt restructuring. General Motors is a metaphor for the United States.

As goes GM, so goes the nation?

The process of bankruptcy or restructuring is necessary to its viability. One way or another, General Motors has to be restructured so that it is a self-sustaining, economically viable entity that people want to lend to again.

This has happened in Latin America regularly. Emerging countries default, and then restructure. It is an essential process to get them economically healthy.

We will go through a giant debt-restructuring, because we either have to bring debt-service payments down so they are low relative to incomes -- the cash flows that are being produced to service them -- or we are going to have to raise incomes by printing a lot of money [Exactly, but keep reading, the story gets even better].

It isn't complicated. It is the same as all bankruptcies, but when it happens pervasively to a country, and the country has a lot of foreign debt denominated in its own currency, it is preferable to print money and devalue.

Isn't the process of restructuring under way in households
and at corporations?

They are cutting costs to service the debt. But they haven't yet done much restructuring. Last year, 2008, was the year of price declines; 2009 and 2010 will be the years of bankruptcies and restructurings. Loans will be written down and assets will be sold. It will be a very difficult time. It is going to surprise a lot of people because many people figure it is bad but still expect, as in all past post-World War II periods, we will come out of it OK. A lot of difficult questions will be asked of policy makers. The government decision-making mechanism is going to be tested, because different people will have different points of view about what should be done.

What are you suggesting?

An example is the Federal Reserve, which has always been an autonomous institution with the freedom to act as it sees fit. Rep. Barney Frank [a Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee] is talking about examining the authority of the Federal Reserve, and that raises the specter of the government and Congress trying to run the Federal Reserve. Everybody will be second-guessing everybody else.

So where do things stand in the process of restructuring?

What the Federal Reserve has done and what the Treasury has done, by and large, is to take an existing debt and say they will own it or lend against it. But they haven't said they are going to write down the debt and cut debt payments each month. There has been little in the way of debt relief yet. Very, very few actual mortgages have been restructured. Very little corporate debt has been restructured.

The Federal Reserve, in particular, has done a number of successful things. The Federal Reserve went out and bought or lent against a lot of the debt. That has had the effect of reducing the risk of that debt defaulting, so that is good in a sense. And because the risk of default has gone down, it has forced the interest rate on the debt to go down, and that is good, too.

However, the reason it hasn't actually produced increased credit activity is because the debtors are still too indebted and not able to properly service the debt. Only when those debts are actually written down will we get to the point where we will have credit growth.

There is a mortgage debt piece that will need to be restructured. There is a giant financial-sector piece -- banks and investment banks and whatever is left of the financial sector -- that will need to be restructured. There is a corporate piece that will need to be restructured, and then there is a commercial-real-estate piece that will need to be restructured.

Is a restructuring of the banks a starting point?

If you think that restructuring the banks is going to get lending going again and you don't restructure the other pieces -- the mortgage piece, the corporate piece, the real-estate piece -- you are wrong, because they need financially sound entities to lend to, and that won't happen until there are restructurings.

On the issue of the banks, ultimately we need banks because to produce credit we have to have banks. A lot of the banks aren't going to have money, and yet we can't just let them go to nothing; we have got to do something. But the future of banking is going to be very, very different. The regulators have to decide how banks will operate.

That means they will have to nationalize some in some form, but they are going to also have to decide who they protect: the bondholders or the depositors?

Nationalization is the most likely outcome?

There will be substantial nationalization of banks. It is going on now and it will continue. But the same question will be asked even after nationalization: What will happen to the pile of bad stuff?

Let's say we are going to end up with the good-bank/bad-bank concept. The government is going to put a lot of money in -- say $100 billion -- and going to get all the garbage at a leverage of, let's say, 10 to 1. They will have a trillion dollars, but a trillion dollars' worth of garbage. They still aren't marking it down.

Does this give you comfort?

Then we have the remaining banks, many of which will be broke. The government will have to recapitalize them. The government will try to seek private money to go in with them, but I don't think they are going to come up with a lot of private money, not nearly the amount needed.

To the extent we are going to have nationalized banks [Citi, BAC for sure, as I have maintained; they are already Fed controlled, if not completely nationalized], we will still have the question of how those banks behave. Does Congress say what they should do? Does Congress demand they lend to bad borrowers? There is a reason they aren't lending.

So whose money is it, and who is protecting that money?

The biggest issue is that if you look at the borrowers, you don't want to lend to them. The basic problem is that the borrowers had too much debt when their incomes were higher and their asset values were higher. Now net worths have gone down.

Let me give you an example. Roughly speaking, most of commercial real estate and a good deal of private equity was bought on leverage of 3-to-1. Most of it is down by more than one-third, so therefore they have negative net worth. Most of them couldn't service their debt when the cash flows were up, and now the cash flows are a lot lower.

If you shouldn't have lent to them before, how can you possibly lend to them now?

I guess I'm thinking of the examples of people and businesses with solid credit records who can't get banks to lend to them. Those examples exist, but they aren't, by and large, the big picture. There are too many non-viable entities. Big pieces of the economy have to become somehow more viable. This isn't primarily about a lack of liquidity. There are certainly elements of that, but this is basically a structural issue. The '30s were very similar to this.

By the way, in the bear market from 1929 to the bottom, stocks declined 89%, [note: in 1929 the DJI stocks were very extended and had the same kind of PEs as 2000. When stocks tanked in 2008, the PEs were much lower because the air was already let out of the stock market, so we will not need to see a DJI of 1400 before this is over. We probably already has seen the DJI low] with six rallies of returns of more than 20% -- and most of them produced renewed optimism. But what happened was that the economy continued to weaken with the debt problem. The Hoover administration had the equivalent of today's TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program] in the Reconstruction Finance Corp. The stimulus program and tax cuts created more spending, and the budget deficit increased.

At the same time, countries around the world encountered a similar kind of thing. England went through then exactly what it is going through now. Just as now, countries couldn't get dollars because of the slowdown in exports, and there was a dollar shortage, as there is now. Efforts were directed at rekindling lending. But they did not rekindle lending. Eventually there were a lot of bankruptcies, which extinguished debt.

In the U.S., a Democratic administration replaced a Republican one and there was a major devaluation and reflation that marked the bottom of the Depression in March 1933. [The timing of the change in Presidents is remarkable in its similarity. The market decline and recession started in 1930 and two years later, there was an election. This time, the housing market peaked in 2006 and two years later, there was an election. I think we are in early 1933 if we use the Great Depression as our reference. That was a great time to get long the stock market]

Where is the U.S. and the rest of the world going to keep getting money to pay for these stimulus packages?

The Federal Reserve is going to have to print money [my blog friends who fear the printing press need to pay attention here. This point is why I discount
what I hear from Marc Faber, Jim Rogers and Peter Schiff. They don't know their history]. The deficits will be greater than the savings. So you will see the Federal Reserve buy long-term Treasury bonds, as it did in the Great Depression [this answers the question about who will lend us the money to back the printing press]. We are in a position where that will eventually create a problem for currencies and drive assets to gold [which, in this context, is okay. I am long gold, but I am also long our economy].

Are you a fan of gold?

Yes.

Have you always been?

No. Gold is horrible sometimes and great other times [because its only value is as an alternate currency or jewelry. Gold has NO inherent value. It is an unproductive asset]. But like any other asset class, everybody always should have a piece of it in their portfolio.

What about bonds? The conventional wisdom has it that bonds are the most overbought and most dangerous asset class right now.

Everything is timing. You print a lot of money, and then you have currency devaluation. The currency devaluation happens before bonds fall. Not much in the way of inflation is produced, because what you are doing actually is negating deflation. So, the first wave of currency depreciation will be very much like England in 1992, with its currency realignment, or the United States during the Great Depression, when they printed money and devalued the dollar a lot. Gold went up a whole lot and the bond market had a hiccup, and then long-term rates continued to decline because people still needed safety and liquidity [this is a point that changes my thinking a bit. I think in terms of either / or; but Dalio makes the case for an overlap of the appreciation of both asset classes].

While the dollar is bad, it doesn't mean necessarily that the bond market is bad. I can easily imagine at some point I'm going to hate bonds and want to be short bonds, but, for now, a portfolio that is a mixture of Treasury bonds and gold is going to be a very good portfolio, because I imagine gold could go up a whole lot and Treasury bonds won't go down a whole lot, at first.

Ideally, creditor countries that don't have dollar-debt problems are the place you want to be, like Japan. The Japanese economy will do horribly, too, but they don't have the problems that we have -- and they have surpluses. They can pull in their assets from abroad, which will support their currency, because they will want to become defensive.

Other currencies will decline in relationship to the yen and in relationship to gold [hmmmm, I don't know if "less bad" is good enough for me. I think Japan is in this with the rest of us; though recent currency action supports Dalio's case here].

And China?

Now we have the delicate China question. That is a complicated, touchy question. The reasons for China to hold dollar-denominated assets no longer exist, for the most part. However, the desire to have a weaker currency is everybody's desire in terms of stimulus.

China recognizes that the exchange-rate peg is not as important as it was before, because the idea was to make its goods competitive in the world. Ultimately, they are going to have to go to a domestic-based economy. But they own too much in the way of dollar-denominated assets to get out, and it isn't clear exactly where they would go if they did get out. But they don't have to buy more. They are not going to continue to want to double down.

From the U.S. point of view, we want a devaluation [YES!! this is the point I always make: we must create inflation to get out of this problem, thereby devaluing the dollar]. A devaluation gets your pricing in line. When there is a deflationary environment, you want your currency to go down. When you have a lot of foreign debt denominated in your currency, you want to create relief by having your currency go down. All major currency devaluations have triggered stock-market rallies throughout the world; one of the best ways to trigger a stock-market rally is to devalue your currency.

But there is a basic structural problem with China. Its per capita income is less than 10% of ours. We have to get our prices in line, and we are not going to do it by cutting our incomes to a level of Chinese incomes.

And they are not going to do it by having their per capita incomes coming in line with our per capita incomes. But they have to come closer together. The Chinese currency and assets are too cheap in dollar terms, so a devaluation of the dollar in relation to China's currency is likely, and will be an important step to our reflation and will make investments in China attractive. [this is a major thesis of mine, and I own FXI, the China equity index fund and will buy more. This is a long term phenomena that will last my lifetime. China will be the major source of commodity demand for decades, so commodities are a great investment here]

You mentioned, too, that inflation is not as big a worry for you as it is for some. Could you elaborate?

A wave of currency devaluations and strong gold will serve to negate deflationary pressures [YES!! another of my points: inflation cancels deflation], bringing inflation to a low, positive number rather than producing unacceptably high inflation [this is the point where Faber, Rogers and Schiff are most wrong because they do not acknowledge the role of cancellation of deflation] -- and that will last for as far as I can see out, roughly about two years.

Given this outlook, what is your view on stocks?

Buying equities and taking on those risks in late 2009, or more likely 2010, will be a great move because equities will be much cheaper than now. It is going to be a buying opportunity of the century.

Thanks, Ray

.

Today, I answer the blogposts of a couple of gold bugs who are a little overwrought with the idea of a new age where gold is king:

"Another Case for Gold": http://livingoffdividends.com/2009/01/31/another-case-for-gold/comment-page-1/#comment-32504

"Boy, Nirav, is the author of this piece mixed up. There are parts of it that are correct, but the overall picture is decidedly mixed and confused.

You and I have been in agreement that gold and other precious metals and hard assets will benefit from a period of monetary expansion once the deleveraging is done. I believe that as long as dollars are printed to replace the financial assets lost in write-downs, there is no inflationary pressure created: no extra demand chasing too little supply. (and in fact, we are now entering a period of excessive inventory, whether houses, cars or clothing, which is the source of all deflations).

But once inventory (supply) is back in balance, then all the excess money supply (demand) will probably cause inflation. How much inflation will be determined by how fast the Fed and Treasury can remove the dollars from circulation. One way is as the author described: by selling Treasuries. But this also is the source of one of his misdirections. Here are the errors I saw in his arguments:

1. “if the Fed floods the market with Treasuries, it will achieve exactly the opposite effect it’s looking for — it will cause rates to rise” - POINT: when the Fed uses this policy of selling Treasuries to reduce monetary supply, it is INTENTIONALLY trying to raise interest rates (see Paul Volcker in 1980). Interest rates must go up to attract buyers to Treasuries. That is the whole point, which addresses another of his confused arguments:
2. “Do you really think the Chinese and the Japanese are going to buy Treasuries at a 2% yield if the Fed is panicking and trying to buy dollars to stop an inflationary price explosion?” POINT - NO, of course not. The Fed already knows it will need to raise interest rates to attract capital to Treasuries once de-leveraging (fear) is out of the market. The very low rates of today are a product of global fear of economic failure. I find it very interesting that global wealth is flowing to the US dollar through Treasuries and not to Gold. It really refutes the Gold Bug argument, doesn’t it?
3. “They’re not going to fund an inflationary dollar at 2%. Ever.” POINT - DUH!! Come on, the author of this piece seems smart and well-educated, but this statement makes me wonder. First, the mechanism for issuing debt of any kind, government or corporate, is through auction. The 2% rate is a product of what the market will bear, not some Federal fiat. Interest rates of all types are set by the market, not be some pre-ordained decision. The Fed officials (really, any one educated in economics) understand that when we enter a period of excess money supply (we can only wish for that right now), then interest rates will be bid higher.
4. The reason for this is also Economics 101: investors are only concerned with the REAL return of an investment, not the NOMINAL return. The real return is the investment return minus inflation. So, the market will ALWAYS require a return that is positive or in excess of inflation. 2-2.5% is the normal expected REAL return for a riskless investment (Treasury). How do we know this? It is quoted every day in the Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). When inflation is negative, as it is right now with a contracting GDP, very low interest rates still generate positive Real Returns.
5. “[In the past] the U.S. money supply was much smaller, and our ability to borrow was much stronger. But those days are gone.” POINT - many younger writers, or those not solid students of economic history, forget the context of “the past”. In the 1950s and early 60s, America’s economic nexus, America was the only country with its economic infrastructure left intact after World War 2. America was never bombed or invaded and its manufacturing infrastructure had been built to the sky in support of the Western World’s war machine. Because hard assets were plentiful, soft assets (currency) were not widely needed. People miss this very important point. Currency is just a substitue for real or hard assets. Those assets can be buildings, machinery, coal, oil or gold. American then, like China now, had lots of assets and against those assets, loaned the rest of the world money so they could rebuild theirs. When you loan money, money supply contracts, just as when you borrow money in expands.
6. The author (and most goldbugs) forget that currencies are comparative. If the entire world prints more money in concert, how can any harm be done? The dollar is just a unit of measure that represents economic exchange. Each dollar represents a fractional claim on the national aggregate assets of America. When I was a small boy, $1 meant a lot (could buy 3 loaves of bread). Today, $1 is probably represented by $10 in making purchases (still buys 3 loaves of bread). Does that change my life in any way? NO. Does it change my buying power in any way? NO. As long as my income is 10 times what it was before (and on average for Americans, it is), it is a wash. No one cares. And as long as the rest of the world follows the same path, it matters not. But, if you hold Real Assets over that time period (gold or real estate, among others), they will hopefully be worth 10 times as much, but probably no more (at least not for long). So, does that ounce of gold today buy any more than it did in 1972? NO. Money is symbolic and comparative, and to try to make some case for a new paradigm for Gold is as hopeless and mindless as those who tried to dismiss it entirely 10 years ago.

As your resident amateur economist, I would like to offer up an article coming from one leg of the PIMCO triumvirate (Paul McCulley, the others being Bill Gross and Mohamend El-Erian) who rule the private sector bond world.

McCulley is the Central Bank expert of the group and his expertise is near Nobel Laureate in its quality and insight. The PIMCO group anticipated the current banking crisis and declared the cause well in advance of the blowup. The PIMCO team labeled the cause as the "Shadow Banking System" and saw the leverage that was being created by hedge funds and others using the tools like "carry trade" to create money through leverage.

Like the rest of us, this group of economists thought the outcome of "shadow banking" would be inflation, as easy money created excess demand. None of them forecast the total collapse of the system and the resultant deflation. However, McCulley suggested the possibilty through his analysis of Hyman Minsky's work as an economist 30 years ago. McCulley uses Minsky to explain money growth and contraction, and does so at times with his pet bunny he keeps in his office (he calls "Bun-Bun").

I thought you might find this article insightful. Here is a sample with my paraphrasing in parantheses:

(It is the explicit responsibility of the Fed to provide a “more than proportionate” response to an economic contraction). That is indeed what is needed to save capitalism from its inherent debt-deflation pathologies. The paradox of deleveraging and the paradox of thrift are beasts of burden that capitalism simply can’t bear alone (that is to say, Capitalism is not a perfect economic system, but occassionally needs help when excess greed or fear get in the way). Only the Minsky Solution can lift that load.”

Here is the entire article:

http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/FF/2008/GCB+December+2008+McCulley+All+In.htm

PIMCO and specifically, Paul McCulley, is the originator of the idea of “Shadow Banking”, which has come to dwarf the Federal Reserve system in the last 10 years. The amount of assets controlled by the shadow bank makes central bank policy implementation difficult, if not impossible. Shadow banking is the creation of money from nothing by private institutions, like hedge funds. Such financial institutiosn were increasingly deregulated in the 1990s and 2000s. Because they could use instruments like the “carry trade” to create money with very little invested capital, by use of massive leverage, the system effectively grew the money supply outside the control of the Central Bank. This was thought to be inflationary by the PIMCO team as late as 2007, but proved to be deflationary instead.

Now, that the shadow banking system is collapsing, it is following exactly the Minsky model. The Minsky Moment, modeled as the “Ponzi Unit” (in the McCulley chart), was achieved almost exactly at the time the biggest real-life ponzi scheme was uncovered, the Madoff Fund. Talk about life imitating art!!

So, the real central bank must transfer the leverage that is disappearing in the private sector, to the public sector, in order that the economy does not collapse into oblivion. I would like to ask Mr. McCulley what is the step to follow in the Minsky Model: how does the leverage that the public sector absorbs from the private sector get resolved? By time alone?

http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2008/IO+January+2008.htm

(Note: Nirav's post tried to make the case that Deflation is just a mirage made up by government flunkees to fool us into believing massive printing of dollars is needed. This would lead to Hyperinflation that would sink our economy. Instead, Nirav wants to see big tax cuts and dramatically lower government spending, along with increased consumer saving and decreased spending. He comes from the Jim Rogers school of economics). http://livingoffdividends.com/2008/12/18/the-deflation-scam/#comment-26971

Nirav, I had a hard time understanding the point of this post Nirav, I had a hard time understanding the point of this post.

The title declares that Deflation is a Scam. This implies it is something made up or false, maybe a government conspiracy. But nothing in the post makes the case for any of that. Your data from the Government show that we have experienced a -12.9% contraction on “All Items” through November. That is the definition of deflation. Are you saying those numbers are made up or falsified? The same data show that in some areas, like Education, there has been some small inflation. But overall, we are experiencing a currency deflation.

It would really be quite hard for you to convince me or probably most others, anything else. We can see it all around us, whether it is gas prices, home prices (and eventually rent as vacant homes create competition for apartments), utilities; even food will come down since raw ingredients like grain have dropped a lot in six months.

There is no question that we are experiencing deflation right now, today. The only question that can be debated is really more a speculation: will we experience deflation tomorrow? I commented in my last post that the government is TRYING to create inflation. It is working very hard to push people away from cash. By definition, that is the only way out of deflation. Any increase in price, even just to get us back to zero price change, would be defined as inflation (or maybe “dis-deflation”?)

Because inflation is the only way out of this mess, it is better to just plan for it (invest in the correct stocks and commodities, and probably not bonds), rather than make arguments that we shouldn’t have inflation. Almost all economists agree that some amount of inflation is required in a healthy economy. Inflation means growth. It means there is demand for the economy’s goods and services. It is excessive inflation that is a problem (over 5% maybe?) not inflation itself. Deflation ALWAYS means a sick economy. It is never desirable for declining aggregate prices since it means too little demand for the amount of goods and services the economy can produce at optimum production.

And what does any of this have to do with tax policy? A deflation is not a tax event nor is an inflation. “The head of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, warned that advanced nations will be hit by violent civil unrest if the elite continue to restructure the economy around their own interests while looting the taxpayer.” Huh??? That statement by someone name Strauss-Kahn(S-K for short? I don’t have much regard for economists with the IMF) makes little sense. Is S-K a Republican or conservative? What does he/she mean by “restructure the economy around their own interests while looting the taxpayer”? That is non-sensical.

The assertion by some that a Republican controlled government would “restructure the economy for their own interests”, though I would not agree with the notion, is at least logical. Republican’s generally favor “supply side” economics that reward the captains of industry (high tax bracket) with the hopes of “trickle down” benefits to the proletariat workers. I understand how this could be perceived as “looting the taxpayer” in the way of S-K’s thinking.
But the new Democratic Administration and Congress, which support and are driving our current economic strategy, are trying to reflate and support the massive financial restructuring TO BENEFIT the proletariate, NOT the elite. The Dems are for socialism, if anything. Obama himself said he wants to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. So, current policy favors the poor. Seems hard to get to Civil Unrest from here.

Now a good deflation, that is how we get civil unrest. High unemployment goes with deflation, almost by definition: as prices fall because of declining demand, business cuts back its production to decrease supply; to cut back production it lays off workers; fewer paid workers creates lower demand leading to even lower prices; and so on. Once there is 15% or more unemployment with many literally out in the streets with nothing to do: well you know the saying about idle hands. Check out the civil unrest in France the past few years for a reference.

So, stop worrying so much about inflation. It is the least of our worries right now. To get to hyperinflation requires the destruction of a country’s productive assets, ala Germany after WW1. Then, any printing of money is hollow, since it can’t be exchanged for anything tangible (like the dollar can be for desirable American assets like Pebble Beach). As long as money is exchanged for assets, even if impaired, it is not devalued by the action. This is why TARP is not really “printing money” as many proclaim. Something was received in kind for the capital infusions, namely assets, either ownership for taxpayers in the company (80% in a a couple cases) or in securities held, like RMBS’s or CDO’s (which contrary to popular opinion, do have some value).

It is much easier to pick good investments during inflation than right now during a deflation. Do you know even one good asset class right now? The answer is no, unless you cite the horrible US dollar (that no one wants, until right now, when it is all anyone wants). I welcome inflation. 5%, no problem, in fact GREAT; 10%, I can still find lots of ways to make money; 20%, okay, there is a limit, but we saw in 1980 how we get out of that one.